

the DEMOCRATIC PARTY
in UTICA



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by

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PREFACE

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As a child I was subject to, but ignorant of, the local Democratic party in Utica. The Democrats had controlled the city government since before I could remember. Legend and myth were the extent of my knowledge. As a college student in New York City I was no longer directly affected by the power of the Democratic party in Utica but began to grow more aware of it. Utica was branded "Sin City" by the New York Journal American and gained notoriety from the widely publicized investigations of official corruption. As a graduate student in Syracuse I was neither affected by nor especially attentive to the party in Utica. The Republican Mayor had won a second term in 1961. As a research assistant to Professor Frank Munger I was asked a couple of questions about the relations between the Utica Democrats to the Harriman administration. I was soon led to a more thorough examination of the party. This book is a product of my findings.

The study is based on information derived from a number of sources. I am grateful to my principal interviewees for the many hours of enlightening conversation extended to me: County Chairman Lawrence T. Gilroy, Executive Editor of the Utica Newspapers Mason C. Taylor, Democratic Elections Commissioner G. Carl Morse, Democratic leader Rufus P. Elefante, and ex-District Attorney John M. Liddy. I am also indebted to the numerous other Uticans who have shared their knowledge and experience with me. Information from interviews is not cited where confidences would be betrayed and anonymities destroyed.

The election data were taken from the Legislative Manual and the records of the Oneida County Board of Elections. Commissioner Morse and his office were extremely cooperative in furnishing materials, working space, and explanations.

The two Utica newspapers, the Observer Dispatch and the Daily Press, were used extensively for historic background and verification of rumor. My apologies to the Utica Public Library for monopolizing their microfilm viewer.

The Governor Harriman Papers in the Syracuse University Archives provided a view of Utica politics from the Governor's Office. They were invaluable for the section on state patronage.

Special thanks go to Professor Frank Munger for his generosity, guidance, and tolerance; also to Merriam and John for their patience and humor.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of this thesis is to examine a single institution which participates in the political process. The selection of the Democratic party in Utica was dictated by circumstance.

Several questions must be asked by the political scientist who confronts the problem of institutional analysis. He ought to ask what kind of organizational system prevails within the institution. Otherwise it remains nebulous what is meant when an existence apart from the individual members is ascribed to the institution. A theory of the party as an organization was developed from direct and indirect observation. The theory owes much of its conceptual framework to the influence of Chester Barnard and Talcott Parsons.

After the nature of the institution has been determined, the political scientist ought to ask which aspects or functions of the institution are relevant to the political process. Three functions are examined in detail: nomination, campaigning, and patronage distribution. Only passing reference is given to other functions. Limitations on research precluded a more exhaustive examination.

The significance of the institution in the political process is gauged roughly from the performance of the aforementioned functions and from the relation of the party to other participants. The party's relationship with the voter can be quantified through census tract and election analysis. Its relationships with other individuals and institutions can be inferred from observable behavior in terms of common or conflicting interest.

No general theory of the political process is attempted here. Several frameworks, not mutually exclusive but reinforcing, are incorporated implicitly throughout the study. Almond's first chapter in The Politics of the Developing Areas is the most comprehensive of these. Munger's model in Decisions in Syracuse, based on ideas of Dahl and Sayre and Kaufmann, has some applicability. The central focus of this paper is not the political process as a whole, but an institution which contributes to that process.

As for method, the nature of the data largely dictated the techniques employed. Since much of the material is based on interviews, newspaper accounts, letters and memorandums, two problems were presented: one of verification, and one of selection. The sincerity of the interviewee is no test of the truth. When several accounts of the same event differed, choices were made which seemed most likely to be true in light of the whole body of evidence.

It is difficult to remain detached and "scientific" when dealing with highly sensitive issues affecting conflicting moral convictions. The sincere righteousness of those with divergent attitudes toward government and the role of the party has its roots in deep ideological tradition. The problem cannot be summarily dismissed by taking one side and conceding nothing to the other. Interviewees were approached sympathetically in order to obtain a feeling for their attitudes.

This study would claim to be scientific not in any rigidly defined sense but in the spirit with which it was approached. Induction is always tentative and dependent upon the objectivity and perspicacity of the observer. No claim is made to perfection. Several considerations were had in mind while writing, which do not spell out any specific methodology, but do indicate the manner in which the subject was approached. The paramount consideration was to seek truth rather than avoid error, as admonished by William James. Fear of being wrong closes many doors. Instrumental to this approach is an eclecticism which does not confine its explanation to one particular discipline but employs what tools are available to the writer. But objectivity was still sought and subjective interpretations are qualified as they occur. Logical consistency was likewise pursued. It was also hoped that simplicity would prevail where possible without distorting meaning.

The Democratic party in Utica is in the midst of upheaval. In the 1950's the party was relatively stable, having consolidated its power in a hierarchical "Organization" or machine. Just as the Organization had come to power through Reform in the late 1920's, today a new Reform movement is challenging the Organization's claim to being the legitimate voice of the party. Today's Reform group differs from the old in that it represents a movement based more on ideological appeal in a day of prosperity rather than on a fundamentally economic appeal in a day of depression.¹

The following analysis is restricted primarily to the Organization as it existed in the 'fifties, with a view toward revealing the sources of its strength and the reasons for its decline.

¹See James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, (Chicago: 1962), ch. 12.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION

The Formal Context

Formally, the Democratic Party in Oneida County consists of those voters who are eligible to vote in the Democratic primary election by virtue of their having enrolled in the party. The formal structure of the party is based upon the Democratic enrollee, who elects representatives to the county committee, the formal governing body of the party. The concern here is not primarily with the formal structure of the party but with the "Organization" which acts as the party. To the extent that formal structural requirements affect the informal Organization, they will be considered. But the main concerns of this study are the structure, functions, effects, and behavior of the Organization which in fact -- though not formally in theory -- is the party as a functioning entity.

The Democratic voter qua voter is not an integral member of the Democratic party Organization. Certainly he affects party policy, since he is taken into account by the party leadership, but only as a tangential force to a sphere of activity which excludes the voters' direct participation. The voter may effect the personnel in the formal party hierarchy through primary elections, and he may determine whether the party's candidates shall hold elected public office, but once having done so he has no direct voice in the conduct of party affairs.

By the party Organization is meant that fluid combination of interactions between individuals who make party policy and participate in party affairs. (Party policy and affairs will be discussed in a following section, p. 18.)

The character of the Organization is determined by the personal character of the members of the Organization and the amount, kinds, and styles of interaction between the members. These elements being dynamic, the Organization is in a constant state of flux.

The Cohesiveness of the Organization is based upon two factors: (1) the willingness of the members to cooperate in the execution of party policy, and (2) the ability of the leadership to maintain and control this willingness. The willingness to cooperate may stem from a wide range of motivations: personal conviction, loyalty, hope, interest, prejudice, greed, impulse, or fear. The ability of the leaders to maintain this willingness is based upon their knowledge of the motivations -- and the forces behind them -- which make the members willing to cooperate in the execution of party policy. Skill in applying this knowledge is the mark of the political leader.

The political party in New York State is regulated by a well developed Election Law¹ and the rules of the party². The party rules are enforceable in courts of law, if they are not inconsistent with State Law. The general

¹Chapter 17 of the Consolidated Laws, Section 69 of the Executive Law, Article 74 of the Penal Law.

²"Rules and Regulations of the Democratic General Committee of Oneida County Proposed and Adopted at the Meeting of Said Committee to be held at Utica, New York - May 2, 1957." Submitted by County Chairman, Walter D. McIncrow.

unit of local party organization is the county. The county committee is a relatively autonomous unit, independent of control by the State and national committees. It is the most comprehensive formal organization of the Democratic party within Oneida County.

The county committee (not to be confused with the county executive committee) is the general representative body in the county elected by the voters who enrolled as Democrats in the previous general election. The unit of representation is the election district.¹ Each city ward and town is divided into election districts. Each election district elects two Democratic committeemen in the primary elections to represent the Democratic voters on the county committee.² "The voting power of each member of the County Committee shall be in proportion to the party vote in the district of sic, read "for" Governor at the last preceding gubernatural sic election."³ The county chairman and other officers of the county committee (two vice-chairmen, a secretary, and a treasurer) are to be elected by majority vote of the committeemen within 20 days after the election of the committeemen.⁴

"The County Committee shall appoint an Executive Committee consisting of 30 enrolled Democrats of the County, of which Committee the Chairman of the County Committee shall be a member and Chairman. The Executive Committee shall have and exercise such powers of the County Committee, when the County Committee is not in session, as the County may by resolution delegate to the Executive Committee from time to time as may be required.⁵ The executive committee thereby gains the necessary legitimacy with which to sanction the actions taken in its name.

The party rules also provide for city committees for Utica and Rome, to consist of the county committeemen from each city. They have a formal organization similar to the county committee. Other committees which are mentioned as having their existence, in whole or in part, in Oneida County are: the Fifth Judicial District, composed of three members from each of Oneida County's two (Legislative) Assembly Districts, plus members from the counties of Lewis, Onondaga, Oswego, Herkimer, and Jefferson; the 34th Congressional District, comprising three members from each A.D. in Oneida County, plus members from Herkimer and Madison Counties; an Assembly District Committee for each of the two A.D.'s in the county, composed of the committeemen of the respective territories.

The primary purpose of these committees is to select candidates for public office in their respective jurisdictions. The candidates are designated by petition in order to have their names placed on the primary ballot. Other candidates not endorsed by the committee also have access to the primary contest through designating petitions. At the primary election the Democratic voters select one of the candidates as the official party nominee for the particular office. The committees and the positions for which they endorse candidates are given in the following table.

¹Ibid., Section 1, g.

³Ibid., Section 12.

⁵Ibid., Section 7.

²Ibid., Section 1, d.

⁴Ibid., Section 10.

TABLE 1

Committees and their Corresponding Offices.

COMMITTEE	OFFICES
County	All County Offices, State Senator, Members of Democratic State Committee.
Assembly District (2)	State Assemblyman, Delegates to Judicial District Convention, Member of Congressional District Committee, Delegates to Democratic State Convention, County Committeemen.
City (Utica and Rome)	City Offices, Ward Offices.*
Town Caucus**	Town Offices
*City Committee may delegate responsibility to ward committeemen.	
**Not formally a "committee," but the body of committeemen from a town	

The formal organization lends all the appearances of a democratic system, with full opportunity for popular control. In practice the Democratic Organization in Oneida County has not generally operated in strict accordance with the traditional requirements of freedom of debate and explicit consent through uncoerced majority vote in the committees. Interest in party government has not been great enough to sustain such a system. Hence the Organization has been able to develop as an authoritarian institution through forfeit or tacit assent given by the non-voters. The actual roles of the members of the formal organization take on a different aspect than that implied in the party rules. In the following analysis the formal member will be considered as he relates to the general Organization.

The Organization in the 'Fifties

The classic machine took a clearly hierarchical form,

with a boss at the head of an organization of workers held together by the spoils of politics and capable of determining the party's nominations and of exerting a mighty influence in elections as well. In its most fully developed form the urban machine became the government in that many major decisions, as well as minor matters, were decided by the party functionaries who managed their puppets in public office.¹

The Democratic Organization in the county in the 'fifties had its physical and psychological center of power in east Utica. The county committee was controlled by the top leadership in Utica. The Rome organization cooperated closely with the Utica machine, but was separate from it in matters that were solely related to Rome. The towns, being overwhelmingly Republican, knew little organization and leadership of their own. It was the Utica machine that was the source of organizational strength for the county and which is the major concern here.

¹v. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 4th Ed., (New York: 1958) p. 370.

The party Organization can be analyzed through a categorization of its members according to a typology of interaction. Basically three main categories can be differentiated: the organizational base, the subleadership, and the top leadership. The members in the organizational base are characterized by interactions primarily limited to the subleadership and other members of the base. The frequency and intensity of interaction are low compared to the other levels. The subleadership has access to some of the top leadership and a part of the organizational base. The members in this category are limited in the scope of possible interactions, since social boundaries are often rigidly enforced, even among the various subleaders. The members of the top leadership are characterized by mutual interaction, frequent interaction with the subleaders, and less contact with the organizational base.

The Organizational Base

The members of the organizational base can be called upon to render support to the party in a variety of ways. They are not a close group, but a combination of diverse types of individuals who differ in motivation, background, responsiveness, and utility to the Organization.

Most committeemen are included in this category. It is impossible to generalize about committeemen, since their title carries little real significance. Some are members of the organizational base only by virtue of their being committeemen: their membership is legal, formal, and potential. Other committeemen are energetic workers, devoted to furthering the cause of their party and committed to improving its strength. Some are motivated by a desire for status and power, others by a sincere sense of civic responsibility, and still others by personal loyalties and friendships.

In the 'fifties committeemen were picked by the leadership and ran unopposed in the primaries. Control of their votes on the county committee was assured by the implied threat of loss of membership in the Organization.

There have been a number of Democratic clubs in the city, whose members are part of the Organization to the extent that they contribute to the party effort. In Utica, as in other upstate cities, the club bears little resemblance to the important New York City clubs. Whereas the club in New York is the primary center of organizational strength, in Utica the political club is of secondary importance. Whereas the New York City club plays an important role in the nominating process, in Utica this function is not performed by the clubs. Clubs in Utica have relatively few adherents. Several wards have their own Democratic clubs, but they are not very stable or active organizations. The two biggest clubs, the East Utica and West Utica Democratic Clubs both include several wards, as does the smaller Central City Democratic Club. These clubs perform two major functions: (1) they act as fund-raising bodies, usually by sponsoring picnics, dinners, and entertainment, and (2) they serve as vehicles of party communication and propaganda. As organizational agencies they reinforce the existing ethnocentric nature of the party Organization, since the West Utica Democratic Club is predominantly Polish and the East Utica Democratic Club is Italian.

Besides the clubs' political role, they serve in another capacity as minor social institutions. This feature of the clubs has undergone a notable deterioration over the past twenty or thirty years, since people have discovered other, more attractive social outlets. During the 'thirties club dinners invariably would be well attended, but today this is no longer true. Club activities are less and less well supported.

The boundary between being an Organization member and being outside the Organization is easily crossed in either direction at this level, so that being a member of the organizational base does not carry the commitment or the consequence which are attached to the higher levels of leadership.

Others who may be considered as members of the organizational base are those recipients of party favors -- welfare, jobs, contracts, administrative and judicial interference, etc. -- who are willing to return the favors at the behest of the party leadership. In this class would be included a wide range of individuals, such as businessmen, lawyers, tavern operators, laborers, political appointees, illiterates, contractors, physicians, and criminals. Together they represent a body of physical, financial, and emotional resources which can be drawn upon by the party leadership.

Volunteers who periodically give of their time and energy -- usually at election time -- make up a fringe membership in the organizational base. They usually owe no particular debt of loyalty to the Organization and may either be their own bosses or members of labor unions and other social or economic groups.

The organizational base contributes to the party effort in three major ways: (1) it provides election workers and rally participants; (2) it finances a considerable part of the party's operations; and (3) it functions as an "opinion elite," spreading the party message at the grassroots level.

The Subleadership

The interactions of individuals in this intermediate stratum of the party Organization are primarily bi-directional. The sub-leaders have dealings with members of the organizational base, who seek party favors and information and who are called upon to perform service for the Organization. The sub-leaders also have direct access to the top leadership, the maintenance of which is most crucial to the preservation of sub-leader status.

The variety of sub-leaders is as diverse as prevails among the organizational base. The category can be subdivided into two major classifications: (1) those persons whose primary interest is politics; and (2) those whose party interest is secondary to occupational, professional, or other considerations. The classifications are theoretically mutually exclusive, but persons may alternately find themselves in either group. Impeding a rigid application of the classifications, as with the major categories, is the limitation of knowledge concerning the various individuals in the Organization. Nevertheless, the distinctions are analytically important for an understanding of the dynamics of the party Organization.

The primary politicians are best illustrated by the aldermen, supervisors and party leaders who seek direct personal rewards from political involvement. They receive requests for party action in a number of areas: for special consideration in public services (street paving, tree cutting, welfare, garbage collection, etc.); for jobs for members of the organizational base and their friends and relatives; for help in obtaining contracts from the government; and for a wide variety of counselling services. These requests are satisfied directly by the sub-leaders if possible, or they are referred to others who can handle the problems. In times when the Democrats have control of the government, the sub-leaders' importance is increased by their greater accessibility to public resources.

The primary sub-leader usually has the allegiance and loyalty of a group of members of the organizational base upon whom he can call to perform services for the party as he represents it. The most important sub-leaders in turn are found closely allied with one of the top leaders.

The secondary sub-leader is often an important lawyer or a labor leader. His primary interest may be winning cases or obtaining privileges for workers. He is in a position to render specialized service and is often called upon to contribute financially to the party Organization. In addition he can marshal support from his many personal contacts. His personal interactions are dominated by his economic activities and less frequently involve other sub-leaders in the party Organization than is the case with the primary sub-leaders.

Many of the more important sub-leaders can be found on the County executive committee and in party and public office. Formal position does not assure inclusion in the top leadership as discussed in the following section. J. Herbert Gilroy¹ had been county chairman from the early 'forties to 1956 when he resigned for reasons of health. The job was of minor importance since the Republicans controlled the state and the county. But when Harriman became governor in 1955, Gilroy had occasion to correspond with the state organization on matters of patronage. This function was often performed not by Gilroy but by O'Dowd and Elefante, writing over his signature. Gilroy's successor, Walter D. McIncrow was typical of the sub-leadership in the primary organization. McIncrow brought little excitement to the post of county chairman and was not very aggressive. Apparently he did little to antagonize the top leadership but was replaced because he did little to help the Organization. Eugene Hanson became chairman in 1960 and might have been useful in reconstructing the tiring Organization if the investigation had not created pressures for reform. Both McIncrow and Hanson got along well with Elefante. They were dropped as county chairmen for someone else with a better chance of uniting the party. Elefante says he thought Lawrence T. (Tom) Gilroy, who became county chairman in 1962, would have a good chance of saving the factionalized Organization. He was mistaken, for Gilroy went with the New Frontier type Reform movement and attempted with no great success so far to build up a rival organization to oppose the old guard machine. Gilroy did not fit well into the old pattern of sub-leadership which characterized his predecessors. Yet neither has he been able to attract much support from the traditional areas of old guard sentiment.

In the 'fifties, the dominant group in the party was the Elefante machine. The opposing factions were of little effective significance. Their leaders are considered as potential sub-leaders since they were incapable of supporting independent policy proposals with action. Both mayors Golder and McKennan were powerless to shape party policy according to their public pronouncements on such issues as "bossism" and "corruption." Edward Hanna, a tragic twentieth century caricature of Don Quixote, had a small popular following but little influence with the primary party Organization. After a mouse versus lion battle with the Central New York Parks Commission and an attempt to unseat Parks head Robert Moses, the would-be reformer sought the party nomination for assemblyman in 1956. He was defeated 2 to 1 in the party primary. Later, however, he was appointed to the newly created position of Utica Parks Commissioner by then Public Safety Commissioner Golder. This appointment reflected not an act of defiance by Golder but a rapprochement

¹J. Herbert Gilroy is an uncle of Lawrence T. (Tom) Gilroy, the present county chairman.

between Hanna and Elefante.

Other sub-leaders who were closer to the Organization included the non-Uticaans G. Carl Morse (Town of Vienna Supervisor, made election commissioner in 1958), Romeyn Vaughn (Town of Trenton commissioner of jurors), and Anthony LaGatta (Rome leader).

In Utica various ethnic group leaders achieved important party sub-leader status, on occasion very close to the top leadership: John Dybas, a Polish leader and long-time city assessor; Fay Bennett, an old Negro with strong connections with the Goldbas family; Benny Niles, another Negro leader whose loyalty has switched between reform and old guard several times since the 'forties; Nicholas Rizzo, a Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety who received a good state appointment as Assistant Labor Commissioner in 1955; Joseph Moskal, alderman from the old 3rd Ward; Moses Goldbas, a Jewish leader in the old 2nd Ward.

The Top Leadership

So far it has been implied that the Democratic Organization is monolithic and that party policy emanates from a single source. Party policy can be defined as the theory behind actions taken authoritatively in the name of the party Organization. If there are contradictory actions taken by different authoritative elements within the Organization, then policy loses its monolithic quality. If the leaders of the city committees in Utica and Rome and the county leader actively support different candidates for the office of district attorney, there is no single policy of the Organization in the county. That it is possible for such a situation to arise without spelling political death for the disputants reflects the nature of the Organization and its leadership. When the top leaders are united, the Organization can be called monolithic. In essence, then, the Organization is potentially polyolithic but will be so only when there is dissention among the leadership.

In the 'fifties the party was primarily monolithic. Its top leadership in the county and cities was closely knit. Disputes were minor, and attempts at reform were ineffective.

The top leadership devoted most of its energy to party matters, had much personal contact with the sub-leaders, and kept the organizational base loyal by satisfying its expectations. Dissenters were kept in line primarily by the implicit threat of withholding party sinews.

At the center of the top leadership Rufus Elefante dominated nearly all aspects of party activity in Oneida County. He had frequent meetings with the other leaders at his Broad Street office and at a most important political institution, Marino's Restaurant. His interactions, unlike some of the other top leaders', were not limited to the leadership, but extended to include anyone from the organizational base who would wait to see him. When Elefante was at the peak of his power in the mid-'fifties, and it was impossible to handle all his visitors efficiently, he delegated responsibility for handling minor matters to his trusted lieutenants at Marino's.

Dean Cope of Syracuse University, formerly an assistant dean at Utica College, tells a story which illustrates the organization of the party at the highest level. When Cope first came to Utica College in the mid-'fifties, he was told by some of his colleagues that he was a fool if he were a Democrat in this city. To illustrate their point, they took him to Marino's for lunch.

While the group was having lunch, one of Cope's knowledgeable colleagues pointed out the various booths in the restaurant: one for contracts, one for welfare, another for jobs, etc. As the group was leaving the restaurant, one of Elefante's lieutenants stopped them at the door and asked them what they wanted to see Rufie about. After they responded that they did not particularly want to talk with Rufie and had merely come for lunch, the lieutenant said in disbelief, "Oh, come now; everybody who comes in here wants to see Rufie." Then he realized that they were from Utica College, which was currently conducting a million-dollar fund-raising drive, and gave the men his unsolicited assurance that they would get their money.

Besides Elefante the top leadership in the 'fifties included: Richard Balch, State Chairman from 1952-1955; Dennis P. O'Dowd, Elefante's weaker counterpart in Polish West Utica; Frank Emma, City Chairman and Deputy Secretary of State under DeSapio in the Harriman administration; Jacob Goldbas, legal counsel to Elefante, whose family had controlled the old 2nd Ward for over fifty years; and Postmaster and ex-mayor Charles S. Donnelly. These six men were probably the most influential in deciding party policy for the machine.¹ The serious opposition of any one of them to a particular policy proposal would either have precluded its adoption or factionalized the top leadership. Two characteristics of the top leaders are their mutual influence on one another and their relative independence of thought, as compared with the dependent sub-leaders. Both characteristics are essential to the definition of top leadership.

Since the Reform movement made inroads into the formal organization and gained control of the office of county chairman, the old guard's claim to being the sole source of party authority in Oneida County has been destroyed. When the old guard controlled the county committee and both city committees, the top leadership was monolithic. When disruption of the Organization occurred, rival leadership developed around the key formal party offices. Reform committeemen were elected who threw their support to County Chairman Tom Gilroy, the committeemen in Rome effectively challenged the leadership of Anthony LaGatta, the Utica City committee elected Alfred Mirante chairman. Mirante appears to be closer to Elefante than Gilroy, but he has considered himself a Reform leader in the past.

These various party offices are focuses of new political organization, but are not important sources of power. The office does not presuppose an organization; its only source of power is legal, not organizational. Elefante still has an Organization, and it appears that he has consolidated the power of that Organization within the city committee. Gilroy's rudimentary organization is less well disciplined than Elefante's. Elefante's committeemen will vote as he directs; Gilroy's will vote against Elefante but are less inclined to follow Gilroy's positive direction.

Organization building is not an easy process. The loyalties that gave Elefante his Organization were not gained by unfulfilled promises. Gilroy has few resources whereby he can develop strong loyalties. The support that Gilroy does have is based to a considerable extent upon a general anti-Elefante sentiment. This sentiment is less directly related to personal security than are the common motivations which produce the willingness to execute party

¹M. William Bray, former Democratic State Chairman and Lieutenant Governor, might be included here. One of the leaders of the Reform movement in the 'twenties, he has been described as Elefante's "mentor." By the 'fifties, however, he had become much less active in politics.

policy and bind organizations together into cohesive, working units. (See Chapter IV for a more extensive treatment of the Reform movement.)

FINANCE

Party finance is a slippery subject to deal with, since records are rarely kept and, if kept, are usually incomplete. When Gilroy took over as county chairman in 1962, all the financial records given him by his predecessor amounted to were a handful of bills and an over-drawn bank account. The parties must file financial statements with the Secretary of State, but these hardly reflect the actual monies spent on party matters. Another complication is that money received or spent by a party functionary is difficult to classify as purely a personal or a party transaction.

The Political Committee Statement filed by Reform county committee treasurer Leon J. Marketos for the 1962 election campaign showed a deficit of over \$17,000. Some of the major items are given in Appendix A. The major sources of receipts were the annual \$25.00 ticket dinner, a dinner honoring national chairman John Bailey, and nearly \$9000 advanced by Gilroy himself. Little money was received as donations from private individuals. The largest items in the expenditure were nearly \$10,000 to Political Images, Inc., \$6,000 to the local communications media, \$5,000 to the Hotel Utica, and \$4,000 cash disbursed to committeemen and poll workers. The Gilroy debt was also included, accounting for over half the deficit. Other monies were spent for printing, telephone service, rent, and office expenses.

The financial statement gives a general idea of the types of financial resources and expenditures of a county committee in a state election year. It does not include the finances of the state organization or the independent resources of rival factions and other committees in the county. As a picture of party finances of the organization in the 'fifties it is misleading.

Commissioner Morse estimates that around \$60-80,000 was spent by the party in typical local election years in the 'fifties. Gilroy's estimate is about the same. Gilroy, however, points out that the money taken in by the Organization was much greater than expenses, indicating that the Organization was operating at a substantial profit. He notes that in local election years when the Democrats controlled the city government the city employees were assessed for 4% of their annual salaries. With a payroll of around \$2,000,000 this amounted to up to \$80,000. (In off-years, the employees were taxed only 2% of their annual pay.) In addition, he estimates that the party raised around \$50,000 from \$25.00 plate dinners which were attended by 2,500 to 3,000 people. These two items alone would leave the party with \$50,000 above their expenditures. It is likely that the party had other expenses, but it also had other sources of revenue.

The connection between party fund-raising and personal income of the top leadership and their party expenditures and personal spending is at best obscure. The success of Rufus Elefante's business operations was certainly promoted, if not dependent upon, his position in the party. His benevolence toward his people was made possible through his ability to operate the party profitably. Control of the party Organization while the Democrats held the reins of local government meant that the privileges available through administrative discretion would be distributed to the friends of the Organization. Being a friend of the Organization might have been expensive, but the privileges to be had were often worth the price. The relation between political and economic power is explored below in the section on patronage.

CHAPTER II

FUNCTIONS

Nominations

Before the Utica scandals of 1958, when Elefante's hold over the party Organization was most powerful, nominations for office in the party and the government were not made without Elefante's consent or acquiescence. Formally, endorsements of candidates for party nomination are made by the various committees as described in Chapter I. When Elefante's grip was tightest, there were very few primary elections in which the Organization candidate was challenged for the party nomination, so that Organization approval was tantamount to nomination. Since Elefante controlled enough votes on the county and city committees, any candidate had to have his approval in order to be nominated.

Elefante was not alone on top of the Organization. Instead of prospective candidates being judged autonomously by the boss a more rational system prevailed. Gilroy relates that the executive committee, which formally endorses candidates, had a screening committee which would seek out possible candidates and present the executive committee with recommendations. The screening committee worked closely with and often included top leaders. According to Morse, rather than the full executive committee discussing and debating the relative merits of the prospective nominees in open session, Elefante, Donnelley, O'Dowd, Balch and one or two others would go behind closed doors, make a decision, come out with one name, and have it accepted perfunctorily by the executive committee.

Usually, nominations for alderman, supervisor and other minor offices went to the attractive party faithful, workers with a long record of service to the party who could be counted on to respect the Organization's wishes. Prospective candidates for minor office would be promoted by the sub-leaders, including ward chairmen whose primary function was to represent their committeemen in dealings with the executive committee. But not all the wards had chairmen. (Elefante's position has been an extra-legal or unofficial one in that he was the accepted leader of the East Utica wards, but not formally a party officer.)

Primaries

When an insurgent managed to get his name on the primary ballot, the formal organization was legally committed not to take sides in the contest. Commissioner Morse's attitude toward the situation is pragmatic: "We'll back the man who wins." But he was speaking in 1963.

The only major primary fight in the 'fifties, before the Reform movement got under way, was the Hanna-Eichler contest for the Second A.D. nomination for assemblyman. Gilroy calls it a sham, since the Republican incumbent, William Calli, was assured of reelection. Gilroy notes that both Hanna and Eichler, the Organization candidate, were non-Italians in a heavily Italian district. He further points out that little over a year following the primary, which Eichler won two to one, it was Hanna who was rewarded with a job as city parks commissioner. Yet the voting statistics show beyond any doubt that Hanna was not wanted by the top leadership (at least in 1956),

and that the Organization did campaign for its candidate in the primary contest.

In the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Wards Hanna received only 211 votes to 1,978 for Eichler. In the towns, where the organization was less active and less appreciated, Hanna beat Eichler 347 to 268. In Utica the Corn Hill wards (12th and 15th) divided evenly between the two candidates. The Organization-controlled areas responded to their leaders' suggestion and provided an overwhelming majority for Eichler.

TABLE 2.

Vote in Utica Wards for Nomination of
Candidate for Assemblyman: 2nd A.D., 1956.

WARD	HANNA	EICHLER	% FOR HANNA
1 (part)	0	124	0%
2 (part)	11	263	4.0%
3	69	154	30.9%
4	49	71	40.8%
5	8	220	3.5%
6 (part)	0	11	---
7	296	284	51.0%
8 (part)	192	1360	12.4%
9 (part)	5	4	---
10	63	193	24.6%
11 (part)	152	194	43.9%
12	233	228	50.5%
13	251	579	30.2%
15	137	137	50.0%
17	193	252	43.4%
Total City	1659	4074	28.9%
Total Towns	347	268	56.4%
Total A.D.	2006	4322	31.7%

In May 1956, Hanna requested that a special deputy attorney general investigate allegations of pending corruption in the June Primary.¹ He charged in June that city employees were working for the party on the taxpayers' time, that ballot boxes were unsealed and that unauthorized personnel counted ballots.² He had also charged that the committeemen were not given a choice of candidates.³ It was never established openly what substance there was to his charges. Hanna had by then made a habit of publicly attacking many official acts that were repulsive to his sense of propriety. Elefante has stated that Hanna got carried away with his sense of self-importance. His activities in the State Parks Commission affair left some state officials with a similar impression.⁴ Nevertheless, the fact that he was beaten 124 to 0 in the

¹Harriman Papers, Laura Davis File, Box 104, memo 5/21/56.

²Utica O.D. 6/8/56.

³Ibid., 6/1/56.

⁴Harriman Papers, Executive Assistant to Counsel File, Box 19, Laura Davis memo to Milton Stewart reflecting views of James Evans, 5/10/55.

1st Ward would be extraordinary if the Organization had not exercised some control over the election. Such one-sided contests are not uncommon in that area and may have been secured as well by legitimate as by illegitimate means. But it must be remembered that the Organization as such is not subject to the law since it is an informal organization. Only the formal party organization is accountable.

In 1961 there was a three-man primary for Mayor. Although the Organization had been plagued by internal dissention, its tenacity was exhibited in the outcome of that contest. The candidates included: the Organization's man, Donovan; an independent Democrat, Natiella; and a reform candidate, Mirante. It is perhaps strange that the machine should have chosen an Irishman, since most of the Organization's voting power is in East Utica. But a look at the voting returns reveals that the Italian-dominated organization could get its voters to vote for a non-Italian even with two other Italians in the race. It may have been thought too that a non-Italian candidate would have greater appeal in the non-Italian parts of the city. This was especially true in the West Utica Wards.

Commissioner Morse and other Democratic leaders have explained the role of the Irish candidate in Utica politics as an acceptable compromise between the Italians and the Poles. Whereas the animosity that exists between the latter two groups might preclude the acceptance of one's candidate by the other group, the Irish have proven acceptable to both groups. The vote-getting ability of the Irish seems slightly greater in Polish west Utica than in Italian east Utica. This can be explained in terms of the original pattern of settlement in the city. East Utica was Irish before it became Italian, and west Utica was German before it became Polish. Hence Irish conflicts were more frequent with the Italians than the Poles. Also, an Irishman, Dennis P. O'Dowd, had proven a trusted leader of the west Utica Democrats.

TABLE 3.

1961 Primary Election Results for Mayor (New Wards).

WARD	NATIELLA	DONOVAN	MIRANTE
1	108	397	53
2	134	603	178
3	167	422	91
4	81	354	58
5	121	264	52
6	117	149	91
7	69	129	48
8	116	266	267
9	64	146	90
10	56	131	76
11	112	267	149
12	157	362	152
13	76	179	88
14	144	470	108
15	206	476	233
16	117	528	90
17	92	207	78
Total City	1937 (21.1%)	5350 (58.3%)	1896 (20.6%)

The Elefante machine seems to have had little trouble winning primary elections. In 1962, when the reform movement ran many candidates for committeemen in an attempt to fracture Elefante's legal base of power, Rufie lost only one committeeman in east Utica. His Organization still was able to marshall support for him at the polls. The Reform movement had not known the advantages of well organized effort.

Conventions

Conventions are held for the purpose of nominating candidates for state-wide elected offices and for supreme court justice. The list of delegates to the state conventions include most of the top leadership in the organization. Compare, for example, the delegates to the 1954 and 1958 state conventions from the 2nd A.D.

TABLE 4.

Delegates to 1954 and 1958 State Conventions from the 2nd A.D.

1954 - J. H. Gilroy, Golder, Balch, Cavallo, O'Dowd, Bray, Emma, Donovan,
Dybas, Palewski.

1958 - J. H. Gilroy, Balch, Rizzo, Bray, Emma, Jacob Goldbas, O'Dowd,
McKenna, McIncrow.

Noteworthy for his absence in either group is Rufus Elefante. Elefante preferred as much as possible to remain behind the scenes and exercise his influence without publicity. The delegates had little trouble forming a consensus of opinion which was adhered to, if not influenced, by Elefante.

In 1958, there were two conventions attended by Oneida County Democrats. The state convention at Buffalo was noteworthy for the chaotic battle over the nomination for U.S. Senator. Carmine DeSapio carried the day with Frank Hogan against the Harriman forces, who were supporting Finletter, and others, who were backing Murray. Several weeks prior to the convention Elefante had called together the Democratic leaders from neighboring counties to form a bloc at the convention. Elefante found his colleagues receptive to his suggestion that they go along with DeSapio and support Frank Hogan.

The other 1958 convention was the 5th Judicial District convention which was held in Syracuse in September. Two positions were open that year, since the Legislature had created an extra seat on the Supreme Court. It was probably in order to assure that the governor would sign the legislation creating the new position that the Republicans agreed in May to an Albany-sponsored plan to share the spoils by nominating only one candidate from each party. By June the Republicans had agreed on their candidate, Bert Lockwood of New Hartford. The Democrats were having less success in choosing their candidate.

Elefante had been asked by Democratic State Chairman Prendergast to support John "Bocco" Young, but Rufie told him that he and Charles Keene, the Democratic county chairman from Onondaga County, had an agreement that an Onondaga County man would be selected. A subsequent

disagreement between Elefante and Keene arose when the Oneida County Democrats began pushing Utica's Mayor McKennan for the nomination. The problem could have been resolved in favor of Young, except that Young had not been active in promoting his own candidacy. Oneida County would have supported him, but his communications were defective.

When the Democratic convention became deadlocked, the Republicans threatened to nominate a second candidate. It was reported that Elefante had been informed of the Republican leaders' plan and that he in turn passed the word to the Democrats, thus providing the stimulus to break the deadlock.¹

The delegates to judicial district conventions are usually lawyers close to the Organization. The Bar Associations are very important in judging the qualifications of the prospective candidates. The direction the delegates will go at the convention, however, is subject to political control. Elefante's voice was important at the 1958 convention, but it was not as influential as some commentators would have it.² He was dealing with a professional class of delegates with whom he had less influence than with the type of delegates to a state convention. His power was primarily restricted to Oneida County, as Keene's was in Onondaga. Had Elefante been omnipotent, Keene would have accepted an Oneida County candidate. When his influence was manifested at the convention, it acted only to stimulate action, not to determine the direction and details of that action.

Campaigning

After the candidates have been nominated, the Organization's interest turns to getting them elected. Not all party nominees are equally supported by the Organization. Much depends on the individual candidate's relationship with the Organization. The candidate cannot rely entirely upon the Organization to win his election, so he must have the support of a corps of volunteers who are not directly associated with the machine. It is usually unwise for a candidate to identify himself too closely with the machine, since charges of bossism can destroy his campaign. The machine is less acceptable to the majority of voters in the city than it is to the Democratic candidates, although the latter may publicly renounce all ties with the machine which may have secured their nomination. Most candidates respect the Organization's power and are willing to do business with it.

In the towns, where the Organization is least effective, local Democratic candidates get little help from the party. Commissioner Morse, who was Supervisor of the Town of Vienna, tells that in his campaigns he received about 75% of his help from his friends and only about 25% from his committeemen. He regrets the fact, being a strong believer in party organization, and explains it by noting that many committeemen have a tendency to seek party office for neighborhood glory and prestige along with patronage. After a token effort to become elected, they do little to help the party: "everyone wants to be a chief; nobody wants to be

¹William H. Lohden, "City-County Report," Utica Observer Dispatch, 9/14/58.

²Ibid.

an Indian." Morse raised most of his own campaign funds. He would give \$5.00 or more to committeemen and other party workers.

There has been a significant change in the style of campaigns over the last twenty years. It used to be that the committeemen and ward chairmen knew every Democratic voter in their districts, and if they failed to canvass their territories they would be replaced. Commissioner Morse estimates that today there is one-tenth the personal contact that there was in earlier years. The change can be attributed to a number of obvious reasons: the development of mass media communication and advertising techniques; the difficulty in catching up with the voters' changes in residence; the lesser utility of the party Organization in times of prosperity; the lack of incentive to work for the machine as other opportunities for advancement are opened; and the relaxed effort of the Organization, taking perennial victory as granted.

The kinds of jobs to be done in campaigns are often tedious and demanding. Mailing campaigns require people to address and stuff envelopes; canvassing demands house-to-house visiting; rallies need to be publicized and heavily attended; fund raising calls for frustrating solicitation and promises as well as attractive entertainment; the candidate must never stop talking: at meetings, on street corners, in the neighborhood, to friends, to strangers, on radio and television, and to the press.

The Organization will help where it can, depending on its stake in the candidate's election. It can get help from labor leaders who will support the candidate in local union newspapers, letters to the membership, and by providing workers and money. It can secure trucks, public address systems, and other paraphernalia and regalia from traditional contributors who owe favors to the party. It can lend strategic and tactical support and counsel from its storehouse of political experience.

The anti-Organization candidate pays the price of defying the machine by sacrificing the sinews and services that can be provided by the Organization. At an initial disadvantage, the independent or Reform Democrat must rely upon the anti-Organization sentiments of a generally inattentive public.

Patronage

"A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get control of government."¹

After having elected its candidates to public office, the party becomes involved in attempts to strengthen its Organization through public means which are otherwise unavailable. This is not exclusively the role or the purpose of the Organization. Although personal self-aggrandizement is an important element in motivations to promote the party, and power may be an end in itself for some in the Organization, there are other considerations which -- even though possibly serving as rationalization for private motives -- serve to unite the party and provide a satisfaction to the participants. These considerations have been spelled out variously by leaders of the two major factions.

¹E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government, (New York: 1941), p. 35.

In a rare public display of philosophical discourse, Elefante ran an ad in the Utica Observer Dispatch on September 23, 1962:

With regard to the editorial in yesterday morning's Press, which stated that 'Rufie Elefante stands for the old way in politics,' it is quite true that I stand for that way in politics which places the welfare of the party and its people above every other consideration. I stand for that way when the word of a leader was his bond. I stand for the belief that leaders should refuse to hold public office or accept city contracts in order to protect and insure the success of his party at the polls. /emphasis added/

The last statement differentiates the party "leader" from the public official. Elefante does not deny that public office should be used for the party's purposes, only that party leaders should not "hold" those offices for such purposes. As a party leader Elefante apparently has had no aversion to using his influence upon city officials for the purposes of the party Organization. The section on jobs and contracts will elucidate this conclusion.

Tom Gilroy, the Reform county chairman, is more idealistic about the relationship between the party and public office. The first consideration is not to the party and its people, but is of a more general nature: i.e., that the party serve the whole people. He feels that the consequence of Elefante-style politics is that the advantages of the party Organization's privileges tend to accrue to the top leadership at the expense of the party and even the members of the Organization. He would rather look less to autocratic leadership in the party -- which has arisen from the party's lower-class, immigrant and illiterate origins -- than to explicit democratic processes operating in the party with an enlightened, middle class base.

The mayor is relatively powerless in Utica unless he has the support of the Common Council. In the 'fifties the Council was overwhelmingly Democratic, and the Mayor was also a Democrat. In 1955, the 7th Ward Republican Alderman Frank Cummings¹ charged (perhaps characteristically for a minority representative) that the Republicans on the Council were free to vote as they pleased (perhaps because their votes carried little weight anyway) while the bosses of the Democratic party told their aldermen how they were to vote.² Because of the dependence of the executive branch on the Common Council, whoever dictated to the aldermen also influenced the administrative process.

In October, 1959, William Lohden wrote a feature article on Elefante in the Observer Dispatch in which he outlined the process by which Elefante allegedly controlled the Council. Noting that much business is transacted during automobile rides, Lohden relates:

Such drives are usually taken before Common Council meetings, with City Clerk Anthony DeGironemo, who serves as Elefante's whip over the Council. During the drive, presumably, DeGironemo gets the word to pass on at the Democratic caucus, immediately prior to the Council meeting.³

¹Cummings later left the Republican party and became a Democratic committeeman.

²Utica Observer Dispatch. 11/2/55.

³Ibid., 10/11/59.

Besides this indirect approach, Elefante also used more direct persuasion. Among those found conversing with him at Marino's are invariably one or two aldermen.

Party control of the government means party control over patronage (employment and contracts). That a party has elected its candidates to public office does not necessarily presuppose Organization control of the government. To the extent that the elected public officials are members of the Organization or will act according to the wishes of the Organization, the Organization can be said to control the government. Since the interests of the Organization candidate are often modified upon taking office, and since relations between the candidate and the Organization may be strained, it follows that control of the government, and hence patronage, is rarely likely to be completely in the hands of the Organization.

It is customary for the elected officials with appointment power to appoint only persons who are acceptable to the party. In some cases the party Organization submits names directly to the appointing agent. In others, mainly for important positions where close working relationships are involved with the elected officials, the affected official will submit names to the party for approval. In either case the party has great influence in the appointment process. When custom is broken and the party is ignored, it is done at the risk of losing the support of the Organization in the next election and may mean political suicide. A mayor who affronts the Organization that controls the common council will be jeopardizing his chances for the implementation of his administrative program, for the mayor is powerless against an adamant council.

"Patronage is best thought of as an incentive system -- a political currency with which to 'purchase' political activity and political responses."¹ The major functions of patronage are outlined by Frank J. Sorauf as:

- maintaining an active party organization,
- promoting intra-party cohesion,
- attracting voters and supporters,
- financing the party and its candidates,
- procuring favorable government action,
- creating party discipline in policy making.²

The forces which have altered party politics and led to the decline of the boss system are closely tied to the changes in the role of patronage. Patronage has become less respectable as it has become a goal rather than a tool of the party Organization. There has been less need for patronage as a system of welfare distribution, and it has become less effective as an incentive mechanism. Yet Patronage persists and "remains the bulwark of local party organization, a faintly anachronistic bulwark..."³

Among Utica Democratic leaders, perception of the changing importance of patronage varies with attitudes toward the party Organization. The old guard tends to overrate its significance, while the Reform leaders tend to minimize its importance.

¹Frank J. Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution in Patronage," in Banfield, ed. Urban Government, (New York: 1961), p. 309. (the article originally appeared in Public Administration Review, vol. XX, no. 1, Winter 1960, pp. 28-34).

²Ibid., pp 309-310.

³Ibid., p. 315.

Tom Gilroy, the Reform county chairman, has said that patronage operates mainly as a display of power, not as an important source of party strength. This is particularly true of his present situation, since he benefits only from federal patronage (Post Office and minor positions in Washington). With the Republicans in control of the city, county, and state governments, little patronage is left to the local Democrats and its positive value is minor.

An earlier county chairman, Walter McIncrow (1956-60) had expressed the old guard attitude toward patronage in a strong letter to the state organization, expressing discontent with the way state patronage was being handled:

I need not tell you that a state political organization is only as strong as its local components. And the influence of a local organization in a state election is dependent in large measure upon our success in having our local loyal Democrats appointed to state positions. To have these state offices filled by Republican hold-overs is damaging to the morale of our organization. Long delay in making appointments to vacancies also hurts our prestige.

* * * *

Our Democratic organization in Utica and Oneida County has been successful ... It has been built upon local patronage.¹

Commissioner Morse is convinced that the party Organization is seriously weakened without patronage. He also believes that despite arguments to the contrary, the amount of patronage available to a party in power today is greater than it has been in the past. He points to civil service agencies, especially on the local and state levels, that operate to the advantage of the controlling party which can manipulate selections through legal loopholes.

It is often for patronage that party members seek positions as committeemen. When the Organization can satisfy the expectations of patronage seekers, it is then in a position whereby it can accumulate debts of loyalty which can be converted to political action. Elefante emphatically maintains that patronage is essential to the survival of a political organization. Mason Taylor, the local newspaper editor, has ascribed Elefante's control over his committeemen and party workers to his influence in securing jobs and contracts.

State Patronage

During the Harriman administration, when Democrats controlled the city and state governments, the patronage power of the local Organization was at its peak. The fact that Dick Balch was state chairman placed Utica in an advantageous position, which assured the local Democrats of at least their share of state patronage.

Shortly after Harriman took office the Oneida County Democratic committee's executive committee met to consider state patronage matters.

¹Harriman Papers, Executive Assistant to Counsel File, Box 3, February 4, 1958.

Several recommendations, "considered almost tantamount to appointment," were made to Balch, the state chairman as well as Oneida County executive committee member. The Utica Daily Press reported the meeting as follows:

Fifteen of the sixteen members of the executive committee met last night in the Hotel Hamilton where the situation was discussed. In addition to these recommendations it also was the consensus that any Oneida County patronage in connection with the State Fair Commission would be handled by Romeyn Vaughn, Boonville, Democratic state committeeman. Any patronage which may be available in connection with the operation of Vernon Downs, will be handled by Anthony LaGatta, prominent Rome leader.

Any further patronage for Oneida County Democrats will be passed in the same way as last night by the county executive committee.¹

Since the executive committee was run by a handful of leaders, and since Elefante was the most influential of them in local politics, the same situation prevailed with respect to state patronage as was the case with nominations. Elefante's consent or acquiescence was essential before recommendations could be made.

It did not take long for Elefante's influence to reach Albany, once the new administration had taken over. In January 1955, Elefante had been in contact with state officials in Utica requesting a retraction of a termination of employment order. The affected employee had been unable to perform his tasks according to the expectations of his superiors. Although he was thought to be lazy, he was in fact a spastic paralytic handicapped in the performance of duties requiring manual dexterity. The matter was referred to Laura Davis, secretary to Milton Stewart, executive assistant to the counsel. (Stewart was the administration aide who handled patronage for the governor).²

Laura Davis did not know who Elefante was at the time and wrote to Ben Wetzler, secretary of the Democratic state committee, "Who is Elefanti [sic] and must [the employee] be retained."³ In reply Wetzler said, "...we would like to have him retained.

"For your information, Rufus Elefante is the Italian leader in Utica and quite a powerful political figure upstate among the Italians. Besides that he is a close personal friend of mine; [the employee] is his cousin."⁴

Two months later the Utica office was still trying to get rid of the cousin, because an additional clerk was needed to do his work. In a memo to Stewart, Laura Davis inquired concerning their policy on the matter, "Did I see a repulsive little squiggle on your Balch list that said 'Stay'?"

¹Utica Daily Press, January 8, 1955.

²Harriman Papers, Executive Assistant to the Counsel File, Box 3, memorandum, Laura Davis to Ben Wetzler, January 24, 1955.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., letter, Wetzler to Davis, January 25, 1955.

The pencilled in response was simply "Yes."¹

Elefante's influence in this case can be traced through two channels: one through Ben Wetzler, "a close personal friend;" the other through Dick Balch, the state chairman from Utica.

Much of the written communication from the local Organization to the state committee was handled by the county chairman. (J. Herbert Gilroy until 1956, Walter D. McIncrow thereafter.) Other officers of the county committee also corresponded with the state committee, usually writing over the stamped signature of the county chairman. Dennis P. O'Dowd and Fred Gigliotti, both treasurer at different times, operated in this area. Elefante corresponded only occasionally. Letters to the state committee were approved by Balch and/or Wetzler and Prendergast and then forwarded to Stewart's office where Laura Davis competently ironed out problems and diplomatically settled minor conflicts and disputes. After the local Democrats had become accustomed to the routine, occasionally they would write directly to Laura Davis.

At times recommendations were made by one of the local functionaries without the knowledge of the others. In June, 1956, the month when J. Herbert Gilroy was succeeded by Walter McIncrow as county chairman, Elefante and Gilroy had written to Mike Prendergast recommending different men for the same position.² During this period of transition Elefante was more actively engaged in correspondence with the state organization over patronage. By then Elefante was better known to the administration, Laura Davis having occasion to refer to him as "one of our good friends in Utica."³

Several months after he became county chairman, McIncrow had occasion to use the patronage channels for his own benefit. Apparently unaware that it is not a difficult process to obtain special license plates, McIncrow thought to utilize his newly found position of influence. The heavily burdened Laura Davis was left to handle such picayune items and was in a position to satisfy McIncrow's request for a symbol of prestige. Although a minor matter, it is typical of the many transactions which help to bolster party morale.

Milton Stewart's office classified patronage appointments according to eight categories of income and importance. Most of the appointments were temporary and provisional, consisting of low-paying, non-demanding jobs for laborer and clerks and students on summer vacation. The more important jobs given to Oneida County people are outlined in the following table:

¹Harriman Papers, Executive Assistant to the Counsel File, Box 3, memorandum, Davis to Stewart, March 13, 1955. Incidentally, the employee in question has since found work in another governmental agency in Utica doing social welfare work. His performance has been exceptionally competent.

TABLE 5.

Appointments from Oneida County,
by type of position: 1955-1958.

CLASS	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER
A	Agency Heads	1
B	Deputies; Board Members; \$1200 salary and over	2
C	Salary \$9000 - \$12,000	1
D	Salary \$5000 - \$9000	8
E	Salary under \$5000	1
F	Honorary (Major)	7
G	Honorary (Minor)	20
H	Temporary and Provisional	hundreds

Of the twelve appointments to the top four classes all were nominated by the party Organization except two. Both the exceptions were positions in the labor department which were filled by recommendations from the CIO and cleared by the local party. Eleven of the twelve were Roman Catholic; the other, Richard Balch, was Protestant. Seven were Italian and two were Polish.

The top appointment went to Richard Balch. Like former state chairman and Lt. Governor, M. William Bray, Balch was made a commissioner on the Public Service Commission, a position carrying a \$25,000 salary. Bray himself received the next highest paying job as a member of the State Building Code Commission. City Chairman Frank A. Emma was made a Deputy Secretary of State under Carmine DeSapio. The Class C and D appointments included Anthony LaGatta, Nicholas Rizzo, and Stephen Pawlinga, all prominent leaders in the party.

The major honorary appointments went to a different kind of group. Not one Italian or Pole was given a Class F appointment. For the most part they were prominent businessmen and friends rather than leaders of the Organization. Mayor Boyd Golder was made a trustee of the State University, and banker Roger Sinnott was appointed to the Labor-Insurance Fund. Two of the seven were Republicans, appointed for their relations with members of the administration and cleared by the local Democrats rather than primarily sponsored by the Organization.

Most of the minor honorary appointments were to positions as trustees and examiners of the state educational and mental institutions in the county, e.g. Mohawk Valley Technical Institute, Utica State Hospital, Marcy State Hospital, and the Rome State School. Others were for positions on the Traffic Safety Council, the Fire Advisory Board, and the Central New York State Parks Commission. The latter appointment, that of Edward A. Hanna, proved a serious embarrassment to the Harriman administration when Hanna set about to clean up every trace of corruption and incompetence in the park system. He was recommended by Dick Balch. When the unexpired term that he had been chosen to fill ended in 1956, he was not reappointed.

For their effect upon party organization strength, the many temporary and provisional appointments were at least as important as the major ones. The greatest benefits from the major appointments probably came in the form of substantial contributions. Having found jobs for the many clerks, typists, laborers, and students, the local party was rewarded with an

expanded and strengthened organizational base. Numerically more loyalties were involved in these minor appointments, although per capita financial returns to the Organization were undoubtedly smaller.

Local Patronage

Most city employees, apart from laborers, are covered by civil service regulations. The local Civil Service Commission is semi-autonomous although subject to state law and limited supervision by the state Civil Service Commission. New members are appointed by the Mayor. The commission makes examinations for competitive positions or uses state exams which are open to anyone interested. From the lists of examinees who pass the exam the administration is free to pick one of the top three names on the list. Within this limit the Organization can exercise partisan discretion. If the Organization can control the three-man commission, it is also in a position to stretch the legal limitations to its benefit.

With the forced resignation of Police Chief Leo Miller early in 1958, the Municipal CSC held an exam for the position, which was passed by two men in May. The three-man commission was headed by a non-Organization Democrat, William Burke, who was replaced as chairman by Rocco DePerno with the support of the third member, Leo C. Bonner. DePerno was an important official in the Teamsters Union and, although a Republican formally, a very close friend of Rufus Elefante. In August one of the two men who passed the exam died. Apparently the Organization did not find the other acceptable, for the CSC refused to establish a list with only his name on it.¹ Fear of his associations may have been the reason for the Organization's opposition.

Not until Republican Mayor Dulan was elected in 1959 did Utica get a new police chief. Rocco DePerno was ousted from the commission on conflict of interest charges that his Teamsters were trying to unionize the Utica Department of Public Works.

While in charge of the Utica Department of Public Works Dennis O'Dowd, the west Utica Democratic leader, had control of an important segment of low-level patronage. From this position O'Dowd acquired considerable power in the party Organization. Writing as a reporter in 1953, Mason Taylor followed the consequences of this fact in the local election campaign:

.....It is no secret that there has been friction within Democratic ranks. The ascendancy of Works Commissioner O'Dowd as Golder's right-hand man and virtual Democratic boss has irked some elements of the party, particularly the East Utica wing. There were reports Golder forces weren't sure until a few days ago how much work East Utica leaders would do in their behalf.²

Control over jobs is an important source of organizational power. Elefante credits much of his success to his ability to do things for his people, especially in the area of providing employment, non-governmental as well as governmental. DePerno's power in the Organization was closely

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, September 10, 1958.

²Ibid., November 4, 1953.

associated with the fact that he was a labor union boss and a member of the Civil Service Commission. O'Dowd's hiring power in the D.P.W. enhanced his position in the Organization. Loyalties to the party Organization among members of the organizational base are usually premised upon the fact that the party has given them something, which is often a job. These loyalties are built around key figures in the Organization who must be reckoned with by the top leadership: they are likely to become top leaders themselves by virtue of this fact.

When the party Organization was in control of the city government, another important source of patronage was its discretion in the granting of municipal contracts. In the 'fifties no competitive bids were required on purchases of under \$500. (Now the amount is \$1000.) Preferential treatment was given naturally to friends of the Organization.

In 1958, during the period of vice, crime, and corruption investigation, Jack Germond of the Gannett Albany Bureau came to Utica to help the local papers write a series of articles dealing with municipal contracts. In a May article by Germond and William Lohden it was found that the city had spent so far that year \$20,000 on tires alone at a loss of at least \$6,000 to the taxpayers. The purchases were made from Rock's Tire and Battery, Inc., and Laino-Fisk Tire Service.

"The Laino firm is one of three at 514 Broad Street [1st Ward] that do considerable business with the city administration on both goods and services.

"The other two, Elefante and Mazza, Inc., and Nick Laino Sons Inc., for example, have been paid more than \$15,000 so far this year for the rental of trucks and snow removal equipment. No bids were taken on this work, either."¹

A paving contract with Midstate Builders amounting to over \$43,000 had also been taken without competitive bids.² Some of the party's top leaders had an interest in the Midstate firm. When several of the company's officers were indicted for income tax offenses, the firm was refused bonding. Unless a company is bonded, it cannot contract business with the government.

Although "...government agencies are prohibited by law from financial dealings with companies in which any official has an interest 'either direct or indirect,' "³ in a city the size of Utica some effort occasionally must be exerted to find a firm where it is possible to satisfy these requirements. Many Utica political leaders' businesses would suffer if they were to accept public office. Elefante's associations with construction, wrecking, and trucking companies have proven extremely valuable both to himself personally and to his associates.

This fact helps explain why Elefante has been content to remain behind the scenes. It has enhanced his effectiveness.

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, May 16, 1958.

²Ibid.

³Albany Knickerbocker News, Associated Press, September 24, 1958.

The Organization is difficult to analyze in detail. It has no formal lines of authority. It keeps no records as such. It operates on a day-to-day basis. It is not consistently virtuous, nor is it predominantly corrupt. (Elefante: "I'm no angel; but I'm not the devil either.") Its rules are unwritten but realistic and pragmatic in that they acknowledge man's weakness as well as his strength.

In Utica the Organization has become legendary. Powers have been attributed to it that it does not have. Elefante has been seen as having his fingers in every pot. Although the great body of myth that has grown up around the Organization is often at odds with reality, the myth has come to have an independent effect of its own on Utica Politics. As long as people believe that something is true, they will act as if it were. As long as the Organization is believed to be omnipotent, people will act as if it were -- to the advantage of the Organization.

CHAPTER III

VOTING

The voter is part of the historic, cultural, and social context in which the party Organization functions. The general level and style of voter participation are important as keys to an understanding of the political status quo. The marginal shifts and trends in voting are important as reflections of the magnitude and direction of the changes in the electorate's desires, interest, attitudes, demands, and tolerance.

The party politician is largely dependent upon the voters' behavior in primary and general elections. He must calculate the probable response of the voter to his actions. He is aided in his calculations by the fact that voter participation, like other areas of life, does not tend to fluctuate drastically unless affected by major crises.

The voter, as part of the political milieu, affects party politics as his behavior is active or passive and conscious or non-conscious. When the voter goes to the polls, he is actively and consciously relating himself to the political process. When he expresses a concern over a situation subject to the power of the party, yet fails to recognize the party's association with the situation, he is actively but non-consciously relating to the political process. Then when he recognizes bad party management and acquiesces in its existence, he is relating passively and consciously to party politics. When his fate is being manipulated by the party Organization, and he is unaware of the party's responsibility for his condition, he is relating both passively and non-consciously.

All four types of behavior affect party politics. All four are important to the party politician who must estimate what kind of public response will follow his actions.

The voter is known collectively to the politician in a number of ways: through socio-economic and ethnic characteristics, registration for elections, party enrollment, turnout at primary and general elections, and through the choices he makes at the polls. He is also known personally by the local politician, but no longer on the scale that was common in an earlier day when door-to-door canvassing and campaigning had not been displaced by modern methods of mass-media communication.

The following analysis is concerned with the voter in his relationship with the Democratic party in general and the Democratic Organization in particular.

Democratic Strength in the County

In 1960 Oneida County had a population of 264,401. Roughly two-fifths of that number was located in the towns outside Utica and Rome. (See Table 6.)

TABLE 6.

Oneida County Population 1940, 1950, 1960.

	TOTAL COUNTY	UTICA	ROME	REST OF COUNTY
1960	264,401	100,410	51,646	112,345
1950	222,850	101,531	41,682	79,637
1940	203,636	100,518	34,214	68,904

The county has sustained a moderate increase in population over the past twenty years. Within the county the change has followed a typical pattern of metropolitan development, exhibiting some striking contrasts. While Utica's size has remained constant for over thirty-five years, the City of Rome has grown rapidly since 1940. Rome's expansion can be explained by two facts: it has a large available land supply outside its inner corporate boundaries; and Griffiss Air Force Base has developed as a major military installation since the second world war. The rest of the county experienced its greatest period of growth in the 'fifties as a result of vast migrations to the suburbs.

TABLE 7.

Population Changes in Oneida County: 1940-50, 1950-60.

	PERCENT INCREASE IN POPULATION				
	New York State	Oneida County	Utica	Rome	Rest of County
1950-60	13	19	-1	24	41
1940-50	10	9	0	22	16

Oneida County is a Republican county by any standard. During the hundred year history of the Republican party, no Democratic presidential candidate has received a majority of the vote cast in Oneida County except for Grover Cleveland in 1884, whose majority was a skimpy nineteen votes, and John Kennedy in 1960, whose appeal to the many Catholic voters was probably instrumental in gaining him a majority of nearly 4,000 votes.

It is generally believed that the vote for governor is the best indicator of party strength in New York. The accompanying time series reveals that since 1938 the county has been roughly 40% Democratic, never deviating as much as 4% from that level.¹

During the Smith, Roosevelt, and early Lehman years the county was more Democratic than it has been in recent times. Since 1920 the towns voted Democratic in only one gubernatorial election, helping to reelect

¹In calculating Democratic strength, I have counted Liberal and American Labor party votes for Democratic candidates as Democratic votes. This was done because it measures effective Democratic strength, which is what determines the outcome of elections. The base upon which the percentages are calculated is the total vote for Democratic and Republican candidates.




FIGURE A. Democratic Strength in Oneida County. Democratic Percent of the two-party vote for Governor 1920-1962. (When the Liberal and/or American Labor Parties endorsed the Democratic candidate, their votes are included as Democratic.)

Roosevelt in 1930. In that election the Democratic vote in the towns was half again what it had been during the past ten years. After the 1930 election the county gradually grew less Democratic in gubernatorial elections, levelling off after the Lehman-Dewey contest of 1938.

Utica has been consistently more Democratic than the county for over forty years. The towns have likewise been consistently less Democratic. The urban-rural, Democratic-Republican, division is emphatically demonstrated by the case of Utica. But Rome presents some unexpected phenomena. This city of 50,000 has exhibited remarkable parallelism with Utica, voting around 8% less Democratic. It also has reflected the political makeup of the whole country with loyal consistency. Most of Rome's population is concentrated within its inner corporate limits, but a substantial number of its citizens live outside this area as suburban and rural-farm dwellers within the "city." This split-jurisdictional-personality leaves Rome's population with a socio-economic and political complexion less urban than Utica and more urban than the rest of the county.

TABLE 8.

Socio-Economic Characteristics and
Democratic Strength in Oneida County

	Median Income: families & unrelated individuals	Median number of school yrs completed persons 25 yrs & over	Foreign stock as % of popu- lation	Housing structures built between 1950 & 1960	Average Democratic strength in gubernatorial elections, 1950-1962
UTICA	\$4995	9.6	39.9%	8.5%	48.6%
ROME	\$5467	10.4	27.8	21.4	43.0
TOWNS	\$5796	11.1	22.2	29.4	31.1
COUNTY	\$5407	10.4	29.9	23.8	40.5

In the 1958 gubernatorial election, the Democratic vote in the county fell off substantially, while the vote in Rome was maintained at its earlier level. The decline in the county was due primarily to the sharp decrease in Utica. The Utica drop-off was in part due to the series of vice, gambling, and corruption trials of 1958, which seem to have had compounded effects. On the one hand, Democrats in Utica defected from their party out of indignation that the local Democratic administration had tolerated scandalous conditions. This was probably most true in the Polish areas of the city. On the other hand, some Democrats -- notably the Italians -- were voting against Harriman for his "unnecessary" investigations which had stirred up anti-Italian sentiment.

It seems that the 1958 election was a deviating election, even though the Democratic comeback in 1962 failed to materialize for Oneida County as a whole. Rome and the rest of the county did recover their 1958 losses. An important factor affecting the level of Democratic strength in 1962 was the split in the local party Organization. Future Democratic performance in the county may well hinge on the resolution of the existing intra-party conflict. It should be pointed out that there is still a

large potential Democratic vote in Utica: witness Kennedy's 64% victory in 1960. Whether this willingness to vote Democratic in a presidential election can be translated into local and state party strength can only be answered by the local party's efforts.

It is possible to get a good idea of Democratic strength in the county for a short period of time, such as the decade of the 1950's, by taking the average of the Democratic percentages of the vote cast in several elections. This is only meaningful if there are not drastic shifts from one election to another. By comparing these averages with averages for the state and the counties outside New York City, we can get a good idea of the county's relation to that of which it is a part.

TABLE 9.

Democratic Strength* in N.Y. State and Oneida County

	Democratic Strength in Gubernatorial Elections				
	1962	1958	1954	1950	1946
New York State	45.4%	45.0%	50.1%	44.3%	43.1%
Counties outside NYC	38.9	36.8	38.1	36.3	31.9
Oneida Cty	38.3	37.3	42.9	43.6	40.6
Utica	44.1	44.8	52.5	53.1	48.9
Rome	41.8	42.9	44.3	42.9	--
Rest of Cty	32.2	28.5	32.2	31.5	--

*Includes Liberal party vote for Democratic Candidates.

	Average Democratic Strength	
	3 years 1950-58	4 years 1950-62
New York State	46.5%	46.2%
Counties outside NYC	37.1	37.5
Oneida Cty	41.3	40.5
Utica	50.1	48.6
Rome	43.4	43.0
Rest of Cty	30.7	31.3

Party enrollment figures give a measure of a different kind of party strength. It is not effective strength that is being measured, but the degree to which the voter tends to identify himself with his party. Enrollment figures give a few clues to the level of party organization with which the voter tends to associate himself. In the following table two indices are adopted: one to demonstrate Democratic strength relative to Republican strength, the other to show Democratic enrollment relative to the total number of registered voters.

TABLE 10.

Enrollment in Oneida County.

Year	Number Registered Total County	Democratic % of Total Democratic & Republican Enrollment.			
		Total Cty	Utica	Rome	Rest of Cty
1959	116,473	47.2	61.6	43.0	33.4
1958	116,437	46.5	61.8	43.1	32.4
1957	114,859	47.4	62.5	42.3	33.0
1956	127,402	44.2	58.7	41.3	30.3
1955	107,552	47.1	61.4	41.6	33.1
1954	109,903	46.0	60.3	42.0	31.4
1953	113,421	46.8	60.5	40.4	31.6
1952	130,509	45.2	58.4	42.0	31.0
1951	112,194	47.8	61.3	44.0	32.5
1950	112,953	48.5	61.3	44.9	33.0
1949	115,889	48.5	60.7	43.5	34.1
1948	117,558	47.0	59.2	40.9	32.4

Year	Democratic % of Total Registered Voters			
	Total Cty	Utica	Rome	Rest of Cty
1959	36.6	57.7	40.2	20.8
1958	37.7	57.8	40.7	22.3
1957	37.6	59.1	40.0	21.2
1956	38.3	54.5	39.0	23.8
1955	38.0	57.7	39.4	22.3
1954	37.7	56.4	39.7	21.6
1953	33.9	56.6	38.1	16.4
1952	38.0	54.3	39.3	22.5
1951	36.3	57.6	41.5	18.6
1950	37.8	57.2	42.5	20.1
1949	38.6	56.4	41.4	21.6
1948	38.2	55.3	38.9	21.2

Registration is highest, while the ratio of Democratic to major party enrollment is low, in presidential election years. This suggests that Republicans are more interested in national politics and less interested in state and local politics than are the Democrats. But the Democratic enrollment as a percentage of the total registered voters is highest in presidential years in the county. This high percentage is caused by the heavily Republican towns, which enjoy the privilege of non-personal registration. The greater interest in presidential elections brings a higher registration, but the non-personal registration seems to discourage enrolling in one of the parties. Since most of the additional registered voters in presidential years are Republican in the county, and especially in the towns, the relatively low enrollment of this increment has the effect of raising the ratio of Democratic enrollees to the total number of registered voters. This does not hold true, however, in the cities,

since there has been no non-personal registration.¹

Regarding the levels of Democratic strength among the cities and towns, Utica again is revealed as much more heavily Democratic than Rome or the rest of the county. Rome's level is again closest to that of the county as a whole, being lower than Utica and higher than the rest of the county. The fluctuations from year to year are minimal among the three areas of the county. Voter identification with political parties is a stable phenomenon, subject to little change. While the voters' expression of support for the party at election time may vary considerably, their ties to the party are quite permanent. The variance in voting from election to election is more closely related to attitudes toward party leadership (personalities and issues) rather than the party per se. The suggestion that 1958 may have been a year of party realignment seems to be over-ruled by the enrollment figures for 1958 and 1959. It would seem that local crises do not affect party identification as do national crises.

The Democratic Voter in Utica

When Utica was originally tracted for the Census Bureau in 1950, it was decided to follow ward boundaries in delineating the census tracts. This procedure has simplified the study of political demography in Utica beyond estimation. It was possible to combine tract data to obtain ward statistics for each of the seventeen wards in the city.²

Population

In 1960 the wards ranged in population from 393 (1st Ward) to 13,420 (8th Ward). The resultant disproportionate representation on the Common Council and Board of Supervisors is obvious. A ward with 393 people had the same representation as one with 13,420.

TABLE 11.

Ward Population 1960.*

<u>Population Group</u>	<u>Wards in Group</u>
over 10,000	8, 13, 7
5000 - 9999	11, 14, 17, 12, 16, 15
2500 - 4999	9, 10, 2
under 2500**	6, 4, 3, 5, 1

*See Appendix B.

**The 1st Ward had a population of 393 in 1960.

¹In 1963 Oneida County adopted a permanent personal registration system, which will undoubtedly change the meaning of enrollment figures as indices of party strength.

²With the redistricting of ward districts in 1961, this procedure has lost its utility.

The over-representation in the small wards benefitted the Democrats at the expense of the Republicans. The eight smallest wards are shown below with their high levels of Democratic strength.¹

TABLE 12.

Ward Size and Democratic Strength.

<u>WARD #</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH</u>
1	393	89.2%
5	1,022	77.8%
3	1,784	65.5%
4	1,976	48.8%
6	2,171	61.8%
2	2,586	82.9%
10	3,275	57.1%
9	4,647	61.4%

The most populous wards, however, did include Democratic wards. Of the three wards over 10,000 population, two were normally Democratic: the 8th (57.1%) and the 13th (53.6%). The system was a product of evolutionary forces, not of a conscious conspiracy to gerrymander the wards.

The population movements which created the unbalanced ward system are still in motion. Between 1950 and 1960, the city's population remained at 100,000. Yet the percentage change of the various wards ranged from +135.5% (16th Ward) to -46.7% (5th Ward). The general direction of the shifts was from the Democratic central parts of the city to the more Republican peripheral areas. With one exception the wards can be categorized according to four degrees of population change. (See Table 13.).

(See next page for Table 13.)

¹Average Dem-Lib % of vote in 1950, 1954, and 1958 gubernatorial elections.

TABLE 13.

Percent Change in Ward Population: 1950-1960.

	Ward #	Percentage Change
Substantial Decrease		
(-15% to -50%)		
	5	-46.7%
	1	-45.1
	3	-33.9
	4	-23.0
	9	-20.7
	2	-19.1
Moderate Decrease		
(-5% to -14.9%)		
	8	-13.5
	10	-12.6
	15	- 7.9
Little Change		
(-5% to +4.9%)		
	12	- 4.5
	7	- 1.7
	11	- 1.3
	14	+ 1.9
Moderate Increase		
(+5% to +15.9%)		
	6	+ 6.5
	17	+12.6
	13	+15.9
Exceptional Increase		
	16	+135%

The implications of these internal shifts for the Democratic party are not entirely clear. While Democratic voting has been down in the city, enrollment has been maintained high. The Democrats in the peripheral areas are not voting Democratic. This is due to disrupted local political conditions. In the central Democratic strongholds Democratic percentages are being maintained at a high level, but they are being based on lower and lower numbers of voters. Until the Democrats offer an attractive candidate for local or state office, the changes in voting potential and location of Democratic strength will have to be guessed at from enrollment figures. The 1960 presidential election offers some information, but only adds to the confusion because of the Catholic factor.

It is evident that the problem of population movement will never be resolved in any definitive sense. Any discussion of population shifts and party strength should take note of the facts that a large number of people do move their residence, and that an increasing number are moving from one community to another. In Utica, for instance, of the 90,476 people over five years of age in 1960, 34,288 had lived in a different house in the United States in 1955. Of this latter number 24,333 lived in Utica or Rome, 3,427 lived in other parts of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area,¹ In addition, 1,203 lived in a foreign country. It will be at least as difficult for the local politician to catch up with the voters as it is for the student.

¹Includes Oneida and Herkimer counties.

Socio-economic Characteristics

Due to the difficulties of catching up with the modern, mobile voter, the next best approach is to study the characteristics of the places where he is found.

Income

The wealthiest wards in the city are the heavily Republican 17th,¹ the slightly Polish 14th, the middle class Italian 13th, and the rapidly expanding 16th; the poorest wards are the central Negro and heavily Italian and Polish areas (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th).

To a considerable extent Democratic strength and low income go hand in hand. A look at Figure B and a comparison of the maps in Figure C and D reveal the association. The maps would better coincide if units smaller than wards were used. Nevertheless there can be little doubt of the validity of the generalization, "the poorer the area, the more Democratic it tends to be."

A closer examination of the maps leads one to question why, for example, the 7th Ward and the 13th Ward, which are in the same income category, exhibit such differences in Democratic strength. The obvious answer is that some other variable explains the discrepancy. In this case the 13th Ward is much more heavily Italian and Catholic than the white-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant 7th. Similarly, a comparison of the 13th and the 15th Wards finds a richer area voting more Democratic for substantially the same reasons.

The most incongruous ward, as far as income and Democratic strength are concerned, is the 4th. The 4th Ward has the fourth lowest median income in the city, yet it is a "slightly Republican" ward. It is located in the heart of the business district. Its population per household is lower than that of any other ward. Its median age is higher than any other ward's. Proportionately twice as many of its residents lived outside the SMSA than was true of the city as a whole. Its unemployment rate is among the highest, while the percentage of the population in the working force is the second lowest.

Actually, the measure of income level employed here is a bit misleading, for it measures the median income for "families and unrelated individuals." There are relatively few "families" in the ward, and their median income is considerably higher than the figure expressed on the map. It has the lowest ratio of registered voters to population over twenty-one years. It is quite probable that those who do vote are those that feel they have the greatest stake in political affairs -- the adult members of families. Hence the relation between income of "families and unrelated individuals" and Democratic strength is of a different kind than obtained in the more balanced wards. Democratic strength is a measure based upon the number of those who vote; in this case income is essentially based upon those who do not vote.

¹Ward numbers refer to old wards.




FIGURE B. Income Related to Democratic Strength by Wards. (Median Income of Families and Unrelated Individuals, 1960. Average Democratic Strength in 1950, 1954, and 1958 Gubernatorial Elections.)





FIGURE C. Distribution of Income, by Wards, 1960. (Median Income of Families and Unrelated Individuals.)

UTICA, N.Y.






FIGURE D. Distribution of Democratic Strength in the 'Fifties, by Wards. (Average Democratic Strength in 1950, 1954, and 1958 gubernatorial elections.)

Education

Figure E shows the distribution of the medians of school years completed for persons over twenty-five years of age. Figure F relates the education variable to Democratic strength. The association between lower education and higher Democratic strength is unmistakable. The scatter diagram is hyperbolic because of other factors which are associated with low education, particularly ethnic characteristics.

The 4th Ward again diverges from the general pattern. The discussion of this ward in the previous section applies to education as well as income.

The 12th and 15th Wards form a buffer zone between Italian east Utica, the downtown business district, and the more Republican 7th Ward. Known as the Corn Hill area, their northern extremities are lower class areas. Moving southward the area gradually, but palpably, becomes more middle class, with the nicest houses located along its southern boundary, Pleasant Street. As would be expected, the more highly educated people live at the southern end. The Republicanism of this area, especially its western sections, is probably best explained in terms of its reaction to near-by, Democratic-Italian east Utica.

Ethnicity

There are three major ethnic groups of political importance in Utica: the Italians, the Poles, and the Negroes. The following map (see Figure G.) shows the residential patterns of these three groups. Census tracts rather than wards were used in order to get a more realistic picture of the different concentrations within such wards as the 11th, 13th, and 14th.

Starting at the oldest section of town, we find a heavy concentration of Negroes in the 1st and 2nd Wards. The Negro tract in the 1st Ward was 57.2% Negro in 1960; in the 2nd Ward the corresponding tract was 81.1% Negro.¹ The Italian wards are located east of this area, the Polish to the west. The 3rd and 5th Wards are mixtures of Negroes and Poles and Italians respectively. The Poles thin out into the 11th and 14th Wards from their center of concentration in the 9th Ward. The 8th Ward and the western half of the 13th Ward are the most heavily Italian areas (over 40% Italian stock.)

The following table expresses the distribution of the three ethnic groups, by groups of wards with high ethnic populations, in relation to the size of the ward groups and the ethnic population of the whole city.

¹The other tracts in these wards are primarily uninhabited. The Thruway, Mohawk River, Barge Canal, and New York Central main line run through this area. The northern boundary of the 1st and 2nd Wards is the Mohawk River.





FIGURE E. Distribution of Education by Wards, 1960. (Median school years completed, persons 25 years and over, 1960.)

Democratic Strength




FIGURE F. Education Related to Democratic Strength, by Wards. (Median number of school years completed, persons 25 years and over, 1960. Average Democratic Strength in 1950, 1954, and 1958 gubernatorial elections.)

UTICA, N.Y.





FIGURE G. Ethnic Group Distribution by Census Tracts, 1960.

TABLE 14.

Ethnic Composition of Ward Groups in Utica.

Ethnic Group	Wards	Ethnic Group Population as % of Ward Group Population	Ethnic Group Population as % of City Ethnic Pop.	Ward Group Population as % of Total City Pop.
Negro	1,2,3,5	37.9%	71.0%	5.8%
Italian	5,8,10,12,13	31.9%	75.1%	37.5%
Polish	3,6,9,11	20.4%	46.2%	16.2%

The Italians have been dominant in the Democratic party, although the Negro wards produce the highest Democratic percentage of the vote at election time. The Polish people have generally been less interested in politics. The leader of the Polish wards in the 'forties and 'fifties was not himself Polish, but Irish. There has never been a Polish Mayor of Utica. The Italians have been more inclined toward political involvement, having elected their own to every position in city government at one time or another. The Democratic party in the city has been controlled by Italians since the rise to power of Rufus Elefante in the 1930's. The rapidly growing Negro community until recently has loyally followed the Italian-east Utica lead in party politics. The Goldbas family of East European Jewish heritage, had controlled the 2nd Ward for fifty-eight years until the 1961 redistricting. Jacob Goldbas is an attorney who works closely with Elefante.

As the Polish and Italian peoples have become assimilated into the community, they have become less amenable to control by political bosses. The Democratic Reform movement has been spear-headed by an Italian, Vincent Rossi. Prosperity has made the son of the immigrant more independent of party favors. Modern communications have opened new worlds to him. His frame of reference has extended beyond his local parish. He is moving to and from the area with increasing frequency. His accent is less and less conspicuous. He will cease to be regarded as an "ethnic."

The Polish and Italian groups are overwhelmingly Catholic in Utica. The Catholic religion has been a strong contributing factor in maintaining the communal unity within each group. Its role in the political process has been reinforcing rather than innovative.

Between the Italians and the Poles there has been considerable antipathy. Although the roots of the conflict are primarily historical, there are modern reasons for its continuity. The residential pattern has a reinforcing effect. The schools are important secondary institutions which, at the high school level, tend to aggregate and perpetuate values responsible for the strife. Utica has two public high schools, Utica Free Academy and Proctor High School. U.F.A. is located in the 7th Ward, Proctor in the 13th. Although U.F.A. has a considerable number of Italian students, it has most of the Polish students in the city. Proctor High is predominantly Italian. Rivalry between the two schools is normally to be expected. However, it is tainted with anti-Italian animus at U.F.A. and anti-Polish sentiment at Proctor. These values are carried into adult life and color the social and political life of the city.

Voter Turnout

Uticans have turned out heaviest in Presidential elections, usually with a total vote 5,000 to 10,000 greater than in state and local elections. Turnout in gubernatorial and mayoral election years is less readily predictable; but it can be said that in recent years turnout for governor has been greater than for mayor, while in earlier years the reverse was true. Table 15 is based on comparisons of local and state elections in which the latter did not fall in presidential years.¹

TABLE 15.

Turnout for Governor and Mayor in Utica compared, 1926-1962.

Years Compared	Turnout for Gov. Greater than for Mayor.	Turnout for Mayor Greater than for Governor.
1962-61		X
1958-59	X	
1958-57	X	
1954-55	X	
1954-53	X	
1950-51	X	
1950-49		X
1946-47	X	
1946-45		X
1942-43		X
1942-41		X
1938-39		X
1938-37	X	
1934-35		X
1934-33	X	
1930-31		X
1930-29		X
1926-27		X
TOTAL	8	10

Since the 'forties the total vote for mayor has been stable at about 40,000. Even the political explosion of the late 'fifties has not disturbed the pattern. It might have been expected that the 1959 election would have attracted many more voters than it did. Yet the increase in turnout over 1957 was only 113. In 1949, following the indictment of ten Democratic party leaders, interest was at the highest level ever for a mayoral election, the total vote being 42,678. In 1958, 44 election districts turned out more heavily than they had in the previous local election; 26 turned out less heavily. Of the 26 that did not turn out as strongly in 1958, 8 were in the Corn Hill area (12th and 15th Wards), 6 were in east Utica, and the rest were scattered principally among the lower-middle class Democratic wards (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, 14th, and 7th). Little effort was made by the local Democratic Organization to help Governor Harriman. Those areas which increased their turnout from 1957 to 1958 were the wealthier and more Republican sections of the city.

¹Before 1938 gubernatorial elections were held every two years on the even-numbered year.

For a general picture of voter turnout and Democratic strength in local elections in the 'fifties, average turnouts and average Democratic strength were calculated. The turnouts are expressed as percentages of the population over 21 years of age. Changes in population were dealt with by assuming a constant change from 1950 to 1960 and basing turnout on the estimated population for the year following each election. Average Democratic strength was determined by dividing by six the sum of the Democratic percentages (Liberal and/or American Labor Party votes included when Democratic candidates were endorsed by either party) for local elections from 1949 to 1959. The results are expressed in the following table.

TABLE 16.

Average Turnout and Democratic Strength
in Local Elections 1949-1959.

Mean Percent of Population over 21 voting in mayoral elections, 1949-1959		Mean Democratic Strength in mayoral elections, 1949-1959	
Percent	Ward Number	Percent	Ward Number
80.8	1	93.4	1
68.6	5	85.4	5
68.3	17	85.3	2
63.8	14	71.0	8
62.4	13	67.9	3
61.6	12	64.6	6
61.3	11	63.7	10
60.3	8	63.2	9
59.7	15	59.3	13
59.5	9	54.4	15
58.0	7	53.2	12
56.8	6	52.2	4
56.2	16	51.9	11
54.9	2	48.5	14
54.3	3	47.8	16
52.5	10	37.7	7
51.4	4	35.4	17

The two wards with the highest turnout are the two most Democratic wards in the city (1st and 5th). These two Italian-Negro east Utica wards are the home wards of the Old Guard Democratic machine. Elefante's citadel, Marino's Restaurant, is located here. The next two wards with the highest turnout are the 17th and 14th, among the four most Republican wards. While the high turnout in the first two wards can be explained by organizational activity, in the 17th and 14th wards the turnout must be ascribed to a high socio-economic level, which is accompanied by a greater sense of citizen duty. The 16th Ward, another upper middle class ward, has had a relatively low turnout because of the fact that most of its population has lived there a very short time and has not established an interest in local politics or has not been eligible to vote because of the residence requirements.

The five wards with the lowest turnout are all lower class, downtown wards (4th, 10th, 3rd, and 2nd and 6th). The 4th and the 10th are not residential wards and any sense of community or neighborhood there is

lacking, due to the low proportion of families to unrelated individuals. The Democratic Organization has made little headway or effort in especially the 4th Ward. The 2nd and 3rd Wards are Negro and Polish, where Democratic strength is high but turnout low.

The 6th Ward basically is Polish and lower-middle class, voting substantially Democratic (64.6%). Generally, the Polish, lower-middle class areas exhibit a lower turnout than their east Utica counterparts. The Polish people are more alienated from the political process than the well organized Italians. This alienation reinforces a sense of futility which is probably the most satisfactory explanation of low participation among lower class voters in general. The lower class Italians, on the other hand, are less apt to feel that their voting is futile, because they are not alienated from the political process and can readily identify with many of the city's most important political leaders.

Registration Drives

When parties conduct registration drives to get out the vote, they operate on assumptions that are not necessarily valid. A booklet entitled "Voter Registration: First Big Step Toward Victory," published by the Democratic National Committee, indicates the methods that should be used to secure the best advantage to the party:

Establish your priority areas on the basis of the following points: 1) those precincts [read wards] with the highest ratio of Democratic votes; 2) those precincts where we won or lost by a small number of votes; 3) those precincts where volunteer canvassers are most readily available.

The third condition can be ignored, assuming that canvassers can work in wards other than their own. The first and second points, however, merit closer scrutiny. No reasons are given for the choice of these two criteria. Implicit, however, are the assumptions that: first, the current Democratic strength in a ward would be maintained, or vary only slightly, if more people registered; second, it is assumed that more people, possibly all, eligible to vote will register to vote if enough persuasion is given. These assumptions are subject to question. The first is not too unreasonable, however, in light of the fact that two wards in Utica (the 1st and 2nd) with similar socio-economic and ethnic characteristics have nearly the same Democratic strength but extremely different turnouts. The second assumption implicit in the Democratic National Committee's criteria is less subject to verification. Possibility, rather than probability, is at the basis of the assumption. Yet since there have been elections in which over 90% of the eligible voters in one ward actually voted, it is probable that in the low-turnout wards a greater turnout could be had with greater effort.

Operating on these same assumptions, conclusions can be drawn that differ with those of the Democratic National Committee. What should be important to registration workers for a political party is how much greater a return is possible in each ward than would be had by maintaining things as they are. From a statistical measure of Democratic improvability it can readily be determined how much effort should be allocated to any one ward, proportional to the number of eligible voters.

The following chart (Figure H) depicts the turnout and Democratic strength of the seventeen Utica wards. The index of improvability is the figure in the area representing the non-voting population over 21 years of age. The index of improvability is the percent of all eligible voters who would vote Democratic in addition to those already voting Democratic, if all eligible voters did in fact vote, and if the current levels of Democratic strength were maintained.

The National Committee's order of priority of the seventeen wards would differ substantially from that established by the index of improvability. (See Table 17). The 1st and 5th Wards would be getting more attention than merited, if the National Committee's system were used. The 4th, 10th, and 16th would be neglected when they should attract greater effort. There is no great conflict between the two systems as far as the other wards are concerned. By referring to Figure H, one readily perceives that the 1st and 5th cannot yield many extra Democratic votes as compared with the 2nd and 10th.

TABLE 17.

Orders of Priority for Democratic Registration Drives.

By Index of Improvability		By National Committee's Criteria	
I	Ward #	Democratic Strength	Ward #
38.5	2	94.4%	1
31.0	3	85.4	5
30.2	10	85.3	2
28.2	8	71.0	8
27.9	6	67.9	3
26.8	5	64.6	6
25.6	9	63.7	10
25.3	4	63.2	9
22.3	13	59.3	13
21.9	15	54.4	15
21.0	16	53.2	12
20.4	12	52.2	4
20.1	11	51.9	11
17.9	1	48.5	14
17.5	14	47.8	16
15.8	7	37.7	7
11.4	17	35.4	17

Vote for President and Governor

Democratic strength in Utica has traditionally been greater than in Rome and the rest of the county. (See Figure A, Page 29). In the 'twenties, when gubernatorial elections were held biannually, the impact of Republican appeal in presidential elections depressed the Democratic vote for governor. The peak in Democratic strength, as measured by the vote for governor, came in 1930 in Utica. The decline after 1930 appears to bear little relation to presidential voting. If the pattern of the 'twenties were true for the 'thirties, it would be expected that FDR would have helped Lehman more in 1932 and 1936 than he did. A popular Republican president helped the Republican gubernatorial candidate in the 'twenties,




FIGURE H. Index of Improvability.

$$(\text{Index of Improvability}) = (1 - \text{turnout}) \cdot (\text{Democratic Strength})$$

but the popular Democratic president had little beneficial impact on the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in the 'thirties.

In 1938 the four-year term for governor was instituted and presidential elections ceased to have direct influence on gubernatorial elections. Since then Utica has exhibited little fluctuation in its vote for governor. The greatest change came in 1958, when the decline in Utica's vote for Harriman was nearly 8%. The new level of Democratic strength was not altered in 1962. It should be seen as a temporary low, explained by Rockefeller's particular appeal and the lack-luster candidates chosen by the Democrats.

Figure I illustrates the different reactions of the voters to presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral elections. From 1936 to 1948 Uticans voted more heavily Democratic for president than for governor. The relation between Democratic enrollment and Democratic voting was closer in presidential elections.

It would seem that when people enroll in a party they tend to identify with the national party. This is probably more true since the depression, when the Democratic party took on a national character that it had not had during the previous Republican era. The Eisenhower elections of 1952 and 1956 found a great many Democrats voting against their party. These people were not voting Republican, however, they were voting for the hero who was "above politics." In 1956, Uticans returned a majority for Wagner, a democrat, in his contest with Javits for a seat in the U.S. Senate. In 1960, Kennedy received 64% of the vote, nearly 30% more than Stevenson got in 1956. Yet this was only 4% more than Truman's 60% in 1948. The effect of Eisenhower's personal popularity was enormous. Kennedy's huge majority was in large part due to the absence of Eisenhower, Kennedy's religion, and Nixon's lack of personal appeal.

Between 1950 and 1954 there was little change in the way Uticans voted for governor. No ward changed as much as 5%. (See Table 18.) Between 1954 and 1958, Utica registered the largest decline in its vote for Harriman of all the cities in the state (except for Long Beach City, whose population increased by 70% between 1950 and 1960.) In only two wards did Harriman's percentage of the vote increase. These were the heavily Democratic and Negro 1st and 2nd Wards.

(See page 50 for Table 18.)

Democratic
Percent




FIGURE 1. Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Mayoral Voting in Utica, 1926-1962. Democratic (plus third party when endorsed) percent of the two-party vote.

TABLE 18.

Vote for Harriman, 1954 and 1958.

WARD	% Change in Harriman's % of the vote.	Harriman's % of the vote.		Change in Harriman's % of the vote.
	1954-58	1954	1958	1954-58
17	-21.8	31.8	26.1	-5.7
15	-19.3	46.7	37.7	-9.0
16	-17.9	44.2	36.3	-7.9
6	-17.4	64.9	55.3	-9.6
7	-17.2	35.4	29.3	-6.1
12	-16.1	51.4	43.1	-8.3
9	-16.1	65.4	54.9	-10.5
11	-15.7	48.4	40.8	-7.6
14	-15.0	47.3	40.2	-7.1
8	-12.5	67.9	59.4	-8.5
13	-10.3	55.1	49.4	-5.7
3	- 5.8	66.0	62.2	-3.8
5	- 5.7	79.3	75.0	-4.5
4	- 3.9	50.3	48.4	-1.9
2	- -	82.2	82.5	+ .3
1	+ 0.0	88.7	89.6	+ .9
TOTAL CITY	-14.5	52.4	44.8	-7.6

Although greatest decline in Harriman's percentage of the vote was in the Polish 9th (-10.5%) and 6th (-9.6%), the greatest loss of strength occurred elsewhere. (Loss of strength is taken as the percent decrease in Harriman's percentage of the vote; i.e., the 1954 percentage divided into the difference between the 1954 and 1958 percentages.) The loss of Harriman's strength for the city as a whole was 14.5% of his 1954 vote. (That is, of every 100 persons that voted for Harriman in 1954, 14.5 did not vote for him in 1958.) The reasons for the decrease were that some who voted Democratic in 1954 voted Republican in 1958, and that some who voted Democratic in 1954 did not vote in 1958. Decreases in the total vote occurred in all wards except the 12th, 13th, 16th, and 17th. The heaviest Democratic areas turned out less enthusiastically than the Republican areas. Part of this difference is undoubtedly due to population movements, but they do not explain the whole difference.

The greatest relative loss of votes for Harriman was in the upper-middle class wards: 17th (-21.8%), 16th (-17.9%). The Corn Hill area also deserted Harriman strongly: 15th (-19.3%, 12th (-16.1%). The heavily Republican 7th Ward's percent decrease was 17.2%. Next among the areas in which the loss was greater than in the city as a whole were the predominantly Polish, west Utica wards: 6th (-17.4%), 9th (-16.1%), 11th (-15.7%), and 14th (-15.0%). The two large east Utica wards, the 8th (-12.5%) and 13th (-10.3%), defected less strongly than the city. The small central wards decreased slightly; the two heavily Negro wards actually increased their percentage of the vote for Harriman.

Apparently some Democrats in Republican wards needed little incentive to vote for a Republican. Harriman provided it by superceding the popular south Utican, District Attorney John Liddy, with a special prosecutor to

Democratic
Percent




FIGURE J. Harriman's Percentage of the vote for Governor by Ward, 1954-1958.

handle the crime investigation of 1958. There was also the important state-wide issue of bossism which was reinforced by the local situation. In addition, 1958 was a recession year, and the more sensitive upper middle class wards may have identified its persistence with Harriman.

In the Polish wards, the Democratic candidate for Congress, Edwin Slusarczyk, won tremendous majorities, while Harriman received a sound drubbing. Of the 21 election districts in the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 11th, and 14th Wards, Slusarczyk carried 20, and Harriman won only 6. The defection from the Harriman ranks in these wards was probably due to local conditions. It may not be too unfair to surmise that a vote against Harriman was a projection of dissatisfaction with the local, Italian-led Democratic Organization. The same explanation might hesitatingly be applied to the Corn Hill wards. Although such a pat answer should be suspect and not taken as the whole reason for the decrease in Harriman's strength -- in light of the increased anti-Italian sentiment provoked by the Apalachin meeting and the subsequent implication of Italians in the Utica "scandals," it is not unreasonable to assume that voting was affected by these events. Harriman would have lost anyway, it is maintained, but he lost by a larger margin in Utica than elsewhere. While the local Organization, with not a little power in the city administration, was in disrepute, the spill-over effects in the gubernatorial election were inevitable.

In the Italian wards the relative decrease in Harriman's vote from 1954 to 1958 was less severe than in most of the other wards. This would tend to suggest that party identification is more stable among Italian Democrats. The Italians had their own special reasons for voting against Harriman. Some felt that the investigations were unnecessary and blamed the governor for using Utica as a proving ground for a reform image he was trying to create. This view was especially current among the party leadership. Many party leaders also took offense at Harriman's surprise arrival at a local dinner to which he was purposefully not invited. Others held Harriman responsible for anti-Italian provocations resulting from the investigations of Apalachin and Utica.

Those wards that changed little in their vote for Harriman included the most Democratic wards in the city. The 1st and 2nd Wards would vote Democratic no matter who ran on the ticket. Ticket-splitting is much less common in these predominantly Negro wards. The voter in the 3rd, 4th and 5th Wards is only a little more discriminating.

Without attempting to control for other variables, the relation between ethnic characteristics and Democratic strength can be represented with some meaning. Figure K shows the deviations from the vote of the city as a whole in the three most Negro, Italian, and Polish wards (2nd, 8th, 9th). There is a striking parallelism between the Italian and Polish wards. There is near parallelism between these wards and the city. This parallelism means that the ethnic groups are affected in the same way by probably the same forces that affect the vote of the whole city. The variations occur at different levels of Democratic strength. The Negro community less reliably reflects the voting pattern of the city or the other two major groups. The reasons are obvious: the Negro has black skin, is suspect, and is not well integrated with the rest of Utica society. While the second or third generation Pole or Italian may not have his grandfather's accent, the tenth generation Negro still has his ancestors' skin.




FIGURE K. Ethnic deviation from City vote for Governor, 1946-1962.

Vote for Mayor

Voting in mayoral elections is more erratic than in gubernatorial elections (See Figure I.). The voters are more likely to cross party lines to elect a mayor. If they tended to identify with the local Democratic party, rather than at the state or national level, they would be more consistent in their support of party candidates locally.

In the 'thirties the party division in mayoral elections was fairly even, but in the 'forties there was considerable oscillation between the parties. In 1941, the popular Democratic mayor, Vincent Corrou, received over 60% of the vote for the fourth term.

In 1943, the Democrats lost with Balch (later the Democratic State Chairman) principally because of his opponent's popularity. Balch was relatively unknown in politics then and had not yet attained the importance that later was to befall him in state and national politics.

Boyd Golder provided the Democrats with an extremely likeable personality in the 1945 election. He won that and the four subsequent elections. In 1947, his percentage of the total vote was under 50% but enough to gain him a plurality over candidates of the Republican party and the newly formed third party, the Better Utica Party. In 1949 and 1951 Golder won heavily again, surviving the charges that he was controlled by the political bosses. The present mayor, Frank Dulan, almost upset Golder in 1953. Golder lost seven wards in 1953 (4th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 7th, and 17th). In 1951 he carried every ward except the 7th and 17th. Dulan's appeal to the Corn Hill wards (12th and 15th) and the 14th Ward probably involved an anti-Italian element.

McKenna's defeat of Nashold in 1955 was not entirely due to the young candidate's personal appeal. Apparently Nashold received little help from the Republican organization. His campaign was hampered by a lack of financial support. A deal was probably made by the leadership of the two local parties. McKenna proved to be a popular mayor, winning a second term in 1957 by the largest margin of any mayor since before 1927. The Utica investigations brought his following administration under heavy attack from the newspapers, social service, religious, and citizens groups. He chose not to run for reelection in 1959.

The local voters overturned the city government with their election of Frank Dulan as Mayor. The issues of the 1959 campaign were bad administration, toleration of official corruption, and bossism in party politics. In 1961 Dulan increased his majority by polling over 60% of the vote. He will win in 1963.

Local issues and candidate personality are more important in determining the outcome of mayoral elections than party appeal. The voter in local elections does not vote the straight party ticket. Some do, of course, but the number that do not is of critical importance in swinging an election to one side or another. Often local issues do not attract the voters' attention. Personalities, activity of the opinion elite, images, and prejudices then seem to determine the behavior of the marginal voter. Yet when local issues grow to crises proportion, as in 1959, they are likely to have a greater impact on the voting public. Crime and corruption make good conversation: water pollution does not.

The old 8th Ward was the purest Italian ward in the 'fifties. Contrasted with the city as a whole the Italian voter has reacted more favorably toward the Democratic Party (See Figure L.) Figure M represents the trend of Italian voting relative to the city's voting. The city Democratic percentage of the vote is held constant at 0, while the differences exhibited by the Italian ward are represented as positive or negative deviations from this city vote.

Since 1927, the 8th Ward has grown more Democratic. In 1927 the 8th Ward was actually 9% more Republican than the city. The east Utica Italians in the 'twenties and before had been regularly Republican under the leadership of Alfred Bertolini. With the reform movement in the Democratic party in the late 'twenties and the conversion of east Utica Italians by Elefante, the Marinós and other Italian friends, the 8th Ward began voting Democratic, increasing to a peak of 67% in 1935. Thereafter, the 8th Ward settled down to a level between 10% and 15% higher than the city. In 1949 the 8th Ward registered a Democratic vote of over 80%, nearly 25% higher than the city. This tremendous increase was a vote of confidence for the party leaders, including Elefante, who were indicted on conspiracy charges shortly before the election.

In 1951, the 8th Ward fell off nearly 20% to a point less than 4% higher than the city. In that election the Republicans had nominated an Italian physician, Vito S. Lee, who took normally Democratic votes from the Italian areas. He still failed to carry the city, however, Golder's popularity giving him greater support in the Polish west Utica wards.

The Italian vote returned to normalcy (relative to the city vote) in 1953 and increased in relative Democratic strength through the 1959 election. The city's response to the revelations of the 1958 investigations was one of indignation in 1959. The decline in Democratic vote in the 8th Ward was not as severe. Italians were apparently disturbed over local political conditions, but not as deeply as the rest of the community. Compared with their reaction to the conspiracy indictment in 1949, their vote in 1959 suggests that they had lost faith in the old leadership.

Vote for Alderman and Supervisor

Elections for alderman and supervisor are taken less seriously than city-wide elections. The following table shows those wards in which there were uncontested elections between 1951 and 1957.

TABLE 19.

Non-contested Elections for Alderman and Supervisor.

	No Contest for Alderman		No Contest for Supervisor	
	WARD NUMBER		WARD NUMBER	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
1957	1,2,4,5,6,10		1,2,4,5,6,10	17
1955	1,2,5,6		1,4,5,6	16
1953	1,2,5,6	7,17	1,2,5,6,10	7,17
1951	1,2,5,6	7,17	1,5,6	7,14,16,17




FIGURE L. Vote For Mayor in Utica and Italian 8th Ward, 1927-1961.

Note: The 1961 Italian vote is given by the combined results of the new 14th and 15th Wards, due to the 1961 redistricting.




FIGURE M. Italian 8th Ward deviation from City vote for Mayor, 1927-1961.

1957 was the high point in local Democratic strength. McKennan won with over 60% of the vote, the scandals had not yet exploded, and the state organization was on good terms with the local machine. From 1951 to 1957 less and less Republicans and more and more Democrats were running unopposed in elections for ward office. The party split among the Utica supervisors changed to benefit Democrats. (See Table 20.)

TABLE 20
Breakdown of Utica Aldermen and Supervisors by Party.
1951-1957

YEAR	ALDERMEN		SUPERVISORS	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
1957	14	3	14	3
1955	12	5	11	6
1953	12	5	11	6
1951	12	5	12	5

Vote in Other Elections

Lynch-Balch ticket, 1950

In 1950 Democrat Richard Balch of Utica ran for Lieutenant Governor against Frank Moore. ^{WALTER} Robert Lynch ran for Governor against Dewey. A comparison of Balch's with Lynch's percentage of the vote (see Figure N.) gives an indication of the impact of a home town candidate upon the behavior of voters in a statewide election.

In every ward in the city Balch ran ahead of Lynch. He nearly carried the normally Republican county. The support he received, however, was not fully convertible into votes for Lynch. Local pride could dictate a strong vote for Balch, but that support was mainly sentimental. In Rome and the rest of the county Balch did less well relative to Lynch than he did in Utica.

If Balch's being on the ticket helped Lynch in Utica, it would be expected that the increase in the Democratic percentage of the vote for governor from 1946 to 1950 would have been substantially greater in Utica than in other upstate cities. The actual increase, given as a percentage of the 1946 figure, does not establish that this is the case. Utica's increase was 8.6%, Albany's was 8.2%, and Syracuse's was 8.8%.

By the same token, any increase between 1950 and 1954 would be expected to be smaller in Utica than in other cities. Curiously, this is the case. Utica's change was -1.1%, while Albany's was +4.5% and Syracuse's was +1.5%. Rome registered a slight increase. The exact nature of the impact of Balch in the 1950 election is thus obscured. If there had been a profound positive effect, the 1946-1950 comparison would have revealed it and Lynch would have received more votes in Utica. Yet the 1950-1954 comparison rules out the suggestion that Balch's candidacy had no effect on Lynch's vote. The probable answer is that Balch helped Lynch only a little, and that the 1954 election must be explained by other variables. The Republican candidate in that election,




FIGURE N. Vote for Balch and Lynch in 1950 election for lieutenant-governor and governor.

Senator Irving Ives, came from Norwich, a small city south of Utica in Chenango County. He had the advantage in Utica of a familiar and established name and an active corps of supporters.

Redistricting, 1960

Due to the efforts of citizen groups, such as the League of Women Voters and the Citizens Association of Greater Utica, and the support of the new city administration, the voters were presented with a redistricting referendum at the general election of 1960. While over 48,000 voters voted for president that year, less than 30,000 voted on the redistricting measure. The referendum was in the form of two propositions: one regarding the readjustment of ward boundaries, the other concerning the reduction of the number of aldermen from seventeen to nine. Since there was little difference between the outcome of the two propositions, and since the second depended upon the first, only the first will be considered.

The result of the election was a strong affirmation of the wisdom of change. If the voters were reacting rationally and voting in order to maximize their power, the smallest wards would have rejected the proposal and the larger wards would have approved it. The issue was not quite that clear-cut. Although the smaller wards had generally lower proportions of Yes votes, it was not because of their size but due to their identification with the local political leaders in the Democratic party who opposed the change as a threat to their power. The largest ward, the 8th, is heavily Democratic and Italian: it voted against the change. One of the smallest wards, the 4th, voted overwhelmingly for the proposal.

Generally the contest was fought along local party lines. The four wards with the highest proportion of Yes votes were the four most Republican wards in the city. The four wards that registered the greatest disapproval of the proposition were the four most Democratic wards. The success of the measure was a defeat for the Old Guard Democratic leadership. Rufus Elefante opposed the redistricting because he felt that the whole county should be redistricted, not just Utica for the benefit of the Republicans. Yet he now maintains that he has not lost as a result of the change. Whereas previously he had control of forty committeemen, he now has 60. The current county chairman, Tom Gilroy, believes that in the long run the redistricting will not hurt the Democrats. He feels that if it were not for the Old Guard, Utica would be a Democratic city.

(See next page for Table 21.)

TABLE 21.

Ward Vote on Redistricting, 1960

WARD	% YES	LOCAL DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH
1	08.6	93.4
5	32.7	85.4
2	35.2	85.3
8	47.7	71.0
6	53.7	64.6
9	57.8	63.2
13	63.8	59.3
10	64.7	63.7
3	65.2	67.9
12	69.3	53.2
4	75.3	52.2
11	75.8	51.9
15	77.2	54.4
16	80.0	47.8
14	80.6	48.5
7	82.1	37.7
17	84.4	35.4

County Charter, 1961

Uticans had another opportunity to change their governmental structure in the following year. 76.3% of the voters in Utica voiced approval of the new county charter. Utica's vote was higher than the rest of the county. Little opposition to the change came from the city. The city had the most to gain, since under existing conditions, county government tended to serve the towns at the city's expense. There was less deviation from ward to ward than there had been in the redistricting referendum. The range of approval was from 64.7% to 84.1%. The Old Guard Democrats had little stake in the issue as compared with the change in ward boundaries.

TABLE 22.

Vote on County Charter: Utica Wards*, 1961.

1	71.5%
2	64.7
3	76.2
4	74.9
5	77.8
6	84.1
7	79.4
8	76.5
9	72.6
10	75.2
11	72.1
12	75.3
13	75.9
14	69.9
15	76.9
16	72.9
17	80.2

*New Wards

County Executive, 1962

In the first election for county executive the Republicans ran Rome Mayor Charles T. Lanigan against Thomas J. Welch, a north Utica service station operator. Welch carried Utica with only 59.6% of the vote and failed to carry Rome and the rest of the county.

Welch did best in the traditional Democratic strongholds, comprising the new 1st, 2nd, 15th and 16th wards, in which he polled between 60% and 70% of the vote. He carried his home ward, the new 17th, with a 56.8% majority. Four other east Utica wards gave him between 50% and 60% of their votes. He lost the new west Utica 3rd and 4th, central city 10th, Corn Hill 8th, and far east Utica 13th by less than 4%. In south Utica Welch carried the lower-middle class Gillmore Village election district in the 5th Ward with 68% of the vote but lost the rest of the ward with only 42.5%. The 7th Ward gave him only 35.3% of its vote, and the adjacent upper-middle class 6th Ward voted less than 30% for Welch.

Welch was a Reform Democrat backed by County Chairman Gilroy. As such he did not have the active support of the Old Guard Elefante machine. He averaged less than 60% of the vote in the new 14th and 15th Wards, which include most of the old 8th. The old 8th Ward averaged over 70% Democratic in the six Mayoral elections from 1949 to 1959, and averaged over 65% Democratic in the three gubernatorial elections in the 'fifties. His claim that the east Utica Democratic workers did little work for him would seem to be verified. But if they worked little for him, and since campaign work affects voting behavior, then they did even less work for Morgenthau, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Welch ran ahead of Morgenthau in ten out of the eleven election districts in the 14th and 15th Wards.

There is no way to accurately compare by wards elections after 1961 with previous elections because of the redistricting. Table D in the Appendix gives a rough conversion formula.

CHAPTER IV

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

The local Democratic party Organization is but one force operating in the community political process. Because of its general interests and particular access to the formal decision making arena in the past, it has been a most important force. It has served as a channel through which other forces have had to operate to gain access to the government. It has served as a focal point around which other more specific interests have been aggregated. Some of these interests are institutionalized, others are fragmented. The party Organization has also found other interests directed against it, both organized and unorganized. The interests surveyed below are examined in their peculiar relationships with the Organization. They are only four of many interests that could be identified.

Republicans

Although generally the Republican organization is the mortal enemy of the Democratic Organization, there have been times when the activity of some of the key Republican figures has tended to obscure that idea. One may call it connivance, collusion, or cooperation -- and it would depend upon ones bias -- but the fact remains that Democratic leaders have worked with Republican leaders when their mutual interests, not their preferences, have deemed it advantageous.

With the Republicans in power in the county and the Democrats in power in the city, opportunity periodically arose for inter-party cooperation in a number of forms. Mason Taylor has said that the old Republican county chairman had been seen out driving with Elefante. Elefante has said that he had entertained Frank Dulan, the present mayor, for the purpose of making political arrangements with him. His attitude is that he would bargain with the opposition and make deals only if he felt that the Democrats would gain by them. "I would buy the Republicans, but I would never sell to them." The general agreement seems to have been that the Republicans would not put up strong candidates in the city, while the Democrats would follow the same course with regard to the county. This understanding was probably in effect in the 1955 Mayoral campaign when Harry Nashold, the Republican candidate, did not receive the kind of support from the Republican organization that could normally be expected.

In 1958, a Reform Republican Rome Supervisor made the statement, "There is no question in my mind concerning the fact that there is a deal between Mr. Kirch /Harold V. Kirch, the Republican chairman of the Board of Supervisors/ and Mr. Rayhill /Leo Rayhill, Oneida County Republican chairman/ and the leader of the Democratic Party." Ercole Ventura, an east Utica Republican was labeled as "Mr. Rayhill's direct liason to Mr. Rufus Elefante."¹ Commissioner Morse relates that Kirch was elected Chairman of the Board of Supervisors with Democratic votes.

¹Jack Berry quoted in the Utica Observer Dispatch, February 12, 1958.

Since the Republicans would win a party line election on the Board, the Democratic Organization did not hesitate to support the Republican they could best work with. There also used to be a working relationship between the Republicans and Democrats whereby the Democrats would intentionally forfeit a supervisor seat in the city in return for favors from the Republican county leaders.

In 1960, Mrs. Tripp Tower, temporary chairman of the Reform Lincoln Republican Club stated to the press regarding a Reform defeat on party endorsements, that one supervisor had delivered proxies from his town to Kirch, "even though he knows ... of the collusion that exists between Kirch and the Democrats through Jim Philips, who is Denny O'Dowd's cousin, Ercole Ventura, the direct liason to Elefante, and Joe Spilka, who is Denny O'Dowd's Republican-Democratic west Utica leader."¹

During the 1958 investigations the New York Times reported, "Considering the recent disclosures, the local Republican leadership might have been expected to exploit them politically. However, their spokesmen have remained strained."² The managing editor of the Observer Dispatch also recalled that he received "No comment" replies from a list of Republican leaders that the paper polled.³

Schattschneider's words seem to be borne out: "Professional politicians as a class develop a remarkable solidarity when their interests are attacked by the public. The bosses of the rival parties in the locality can often lend each other a helping hand."⁴

Labor

Although Tom Gilroy has said that much of labor's influence in the party is "mythical," he does concede that they do contribute importantly to the party. Their influence is greatest where principles significantly affecting labor are involved. While Commissioner Morse feels that labor's greatest contribution is financial, Elefante deemphasizes it and points to other forms of help such as providing manpower, mailing letters to union members, acting as opinion leaders, and getting out the vote.

Rocco DePerno, chairman of a large north-eastern division of the Teamsters, and Leo Bonner, head of the local Steel Workers Union, together made up two-thirds of the Utica Municipal Civil Service Commission until DePerno's ouster in 1960. A number of labor leaders received minor honorary appointments from the Harriman administration, including DePerno, William Cross of the State Fire Fighters Association, and Harold Coleman of the local Carpenters Union.

Generally, labor tends to be Democratic. In some ways, because of the similarity in their organizational structure and their common interests,

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, April 1, 1960.

²New York Times, April 20, 1958, p. 74.

³Syracuse Post Standard, May 15, 1958.

⁴E.E. Schattschneider, op. cit., p. 183.

the two groups parallel and overlap each other in their activities and membership. Labor continues to be a source of voting strength (although the trend is decreasing), but the organizational alignment with the Democrats is dependent upon the relations of the leaders. In Utica the most important union leader, Rocco DePerno, is very close to Rufus Elefante.

The Press

The sympathies of the Utica papers lie more on the Republican than the Democratic side of the political fence. Both papers, the Observer Dispatch and the Daily Press are Gannett newspapers, having their plant and offices in the same building.

The greatest impact the papers have had on Democratic politics occurred during the 1958 investigations. Elefante claims that the newspapers are in large part to "blame" for the troubles which beset the city. When in 1959 he hinted that he might run for mayor, it was reported that "...it would be a showdown between Elefante and the Utica newspapers. ...He is said to be extremely bitter about the newspapers' coverage of city affairs over the past year and a half."¹ One of the problems that particularly disturbed him was his feeling that the papers were guilty of an anti-Italian bias.

Mayor McKennan and other Democrats also placed a good deal of the blame on the papers. Charges of monopolism were frequent and investigations of the papers' activities were asked by such men as Edward Hanna. A bill was introduced in the Common Council which would have laid a five percent tax on printed advertising. The city clerk even barred reporters from examining proposed Common Council ordinances. The Mayor ordered City Hall to keep information from one unsympathetic reporter.² The papers retorted with charges of "gagging the press" and infringement on the freedom of the people to know the facts.

The papers did not seem to be directing their attack at the Democratic party in general, but more particularly at the system of party organization in Utica. An example of the papers' attitude toward the party in 1955 is given in the following piece:

Over the years Mayor Boyd Golder has proved by five elections that he has many friends and loyal supporters. Even political opponents are often found giving him credit for good intentions and blaming obvious booboos in local government on the 'Organization' or the Common Council.³

Bossism was always good copy, which meant that Elefante and his Organization were the subjects of frequent attacks by the press. In a series of O.D. editorials in 1959 the typical good government attitude is nicely expressed. One entitled "Boss Rule Must Go" said, "there never has been a reason for fear of any local political power, if enough of those threatened by it face

¹Tony Vella in the Utica Observer Dispatch, June 7, 1959.

²Niagara Falls Gazette, May 14, 1958.

³Utica Observer Dispatch, July 16, 1955.

it down."¹ The next day it was admonished, "You get what you vote for, and if you don't vote you get what you deserve."² A Press editorial in 1962 was more explicit in its denunciation of bossism and led to a reply by Elefante in a political advertisement (see above, p. 18): "'Rufie' stands for the old way. He stands for retreat. He stands for closed-door politics and bossism. He stands for a program that has been defeated many times. He stands for ideas and principles that Utica and Oneida County voters must always defeat."³

Elefante acknowledges the right of a paper to editorialize but complains that the editors' feelings seem to be reflected in what should be objective reporting. He feels that the papers are often guilty of printing half truths without presenting accurately both sides of the argument. One example of this kind of reporting appeared in 1955 in an article on public housing. The reporter found that there were a disproportionate number of Democrats living in low-rent public housing, as if to say that there was conscious exclusion of Republicans for partisan reasons.⁴ Of course there were more Democrats in public housing, just as there are more Democrats generally among the poor. (See Chapter III.)

The result of the papers' anti-bossism, anti-crime, good government campaign in 1958 (which had its beginning years earlier) was recognition with a Pulitzer Prize for "meritorious public service." Although an esteemed honor in most circles, many Organization Democrats regarded it as a sham.

The "Shady" Side of the Law

Although Utica was politically controlled by the Democratic Organization from 1946 to 1959, it would be absurd to hold it responsible for all that transpired during that period. Yet if the major organized illegal activities were not sponsored actively, their existence was at least known by the Organization. Prostitution, gambling, official corruption, and other illicit and illegal activities did prevail in the city. The complete role of the Organization leadership in allowing them to go on is impossible to research adequately. Yet that there must have been at least some association is obvious.

Tom Gilroy feels that the Organization could and should have done something to counteract crime, vice, and corruption before the investigations were started in 1958. He places a good deal of blame on those people with positions of responsibility, such as the previous county chairmen, who took neither positive nor negative action with regard to the conditions but acquiesced in their perpetration. It is easier to do nothing than to disturb the status quo at the risk of personal loss of fortune.

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, November 1, 1959.

²Ibid., November 2, 1959.

³Utica Daily Press, September 12, 1962.

⁴Utica Observer Dispatch, June 12, 1955.

A decade before the sensational Utica scandals became national news, another close brush with the law found the Organization in the spotlight. In 1949 ten Democratic leaders were indicted on conspiracy charges of buying votes and influencing and controlling public officials. Mayor Golder denounced the indictment as a "part of a sinister, revengeful scheme to destroy the Democratic Party in Utica and Oneida County."¹ In the mayoral election campaign that year the Republican candidate, Samuel Miller, claimed that Golder was run by political bosses who have a "finger in every horse room, gambling joint and pawdry house." Then city chairman Balch emphatically denied the charges.²

A week after the election, which the Democrats won overwhelmingly in the county as well as the city, the conspiracy trial began. The prosecuting attorney Frank Pratt attempted to link all the known illegal operations in the city with Rufus Elefante and the other defendants.³ Testimony revealed such practices as bi-weekly \$5.00 collections from D.P.W. employees which went to party treasurer O'Dowd; tip-offs by police to gambling establishments; association of Elefante and the deputy police chief with "Happy" Longo, a close associate of future delegates to the 1957 Apalachin convention; establishment that Elefante had an interest in property on which a house of prostitution was located; and acceptance of \$5.00 from Elefante to vote. The latter testimony was contradicted by Dr. James Douglas who maintained that the money had been given for the recipient's family who were "starving and hungry."

The competent defense attorney in his summation to the jury said: "Out of 669 votes cast in the Second Ward polling place at Washington Courts, there were just six persons, besides the three already mentioned, who were alleged to have received any money. These were people in destitute circumstances. None of them was paid for voting for any particular candidate or any particular party.

"...And yet for an entire year Police were here for an investigation. They charge 'wholesale buying of votes' and 'wholesale invasion of the ballot.' It just isn't here."⁴

The Prosecution had this to say: "these crooks rang up the voting machine like cash registers...Who is Elefante? He is the boss of Utica. The police department was dominated by this group. If anyone goes to jail for operating a horseroom, it won't be Elefante ..They'll never catch up with Elefante, he's too smart, and he's too big.

"...Can you wonder why we got even a single witness to testify? You saw them on the witness stand, shaking with fright. They have the fear of perjury and the fear of this group of defendants whom they were forced to face.

"...This man Elefante is so power mad he corrupted the Utica Police Department and even tried to corrupt the troopers in the investigation.

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, October 10, 1949.

²Ibid., October 21, 1949.

³Also indicted were: O'Dowd, Thomas Ruggiero (5th Ward Alderman), Martin Kozlowski (police lieutenant), Lawrence DePerno (5th Ward election official), A.Fay Bennett (Negro leader), Elliot "Smiles" Johnson (aide to Bennett). Three others were indicted but charges were dropped before the trial.

⁴Utica Observer Dispatch, December 19, 1949.

"...It was Rufie who gave the orders to Deputy Police Chief Fiore for the Global War Veterans an alleged horseroom closing."¹

The defendants were all acquitted by the jury. It had been said that the jury was intimidated by the friends of the Defendants. One witness was kept at the home of Prosecutor Pratt to protect him from threats.

The defense attorney, Paul Shanahan of Syracuse, was being paid \$1,000 per day. The Organization was strained to raise such an amount and turned to the organizational base for backing. One west Utica tavern owner offered to write the solicitor a check for \$25.00. He received as a response, "God, no! No checks." After handing over the cash, the bar-keeper realized what he was doing and henceforth withdrew his support from the Organization.

Elefante has said, "Certainly I'm no angel, but I'm not the devil either." His attitude toward prostitution, gambling, and corruption recognizes that in every city a certain amount of this sort of activity does exist. He felt that Utica was no worse than other cities in this regard. He says that it is a social fact that there are needs for such operations and that anyone who would rid the city completely of such activities would be doing the community a disservice. He feels the law is inadequate because it is blind to these ideas.

As for the role of the politician, Rufie is Machiavellian in this respect that politicians cannot practice the same morality and virtues of the detached citizen. The rules of the game prohibit it. He feels that men like Gilroy and the "do-gooders" do not know the rules and want to make their own rules. What is important is to win. Rufie says that the rules are there and he did not make them. It is the rules which have made America great: the rules and the able politicians who play according to them.

Elefante may have been narrow in his attitude toward the political process. Yet he may have been right so far as Organization politics is concerned, but the Organization and its power have never constituted the whole of the political process. When the big investigations broke out in 1958, proof was provided that the press, citizens groups, and Reform politicians were able to use different rules and play the political game effectively according to them.

The State Police raid on the "Apalachin Convention" in 1957 established that several Uticans had attended, and a number of inquiries were made into their associations and activities in Utica. The New York Journal-American, which had been giving the Apalachin meeting sensational coverage sent reporters to look into the Utica situation. The publicity, given in the Hearst tradition, labeled Utica as the "Sin City" of the East. There followed a series of investigations conducted by the governor's Commissioner of Investigations, the Oneida County Grand Jury, the Department of Justice, the McClellan Committee, the New York State Crime Commission, the State Police, the Utica Common Council, and the Joint Legislative Committee on Government Operations (the "Watchdog" Committee). The investigations, the subsequent trials, the Utica newspapers' campaign, and the national attention given by such magazines

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, December 19, 1949.

as Look and Newsweek,¹ aroused the Uticans to a level of interest in local matters that they had never known before.

The results of the investigations included: the resignation of Police Chief Leo Miller because of an unexplained \$10,000 in cash in a tin box found in his home; the resignation of Deputy Police Chief Fiore for unsatisfactory explanation of financial practices; the reappointment of Fiore as a Clerk in the City Clerk's office and his subsequent suspension from that position; newspapermen were intimidated; service clubs, church groups, and citizen groups became loud in their protests of newly uncovered conditions; Governor Harriman supported the newspapers in their stand; a special prosecutor was brought in to supercede District Attorney John Liddy in the local investigation; seven persons were indicted on vice charges; thirteen bookmakers were arrested; Superintendent of Streets Joseph Bolliettieri was convicted of fraud and grand larceny; Dennis O'Dowd was barred from holding public office and later convicted for bribing a witness, attempting to incite a witness to commit perjury, and conspiring to obstruct justice; four detectives were convicted on perjury and conspiracy charges; Fiore was convicted for aiding and abetting prostitution, first and second degree perjury, attempting to incite a witness to commit perjury, and conspiring to obstruct justice; and a Republican was elected to two terms as Mayor.

The events and disclosures had a critical impact upon the Democratic Organization. While the 1957 election was said to be a "people's mandate" for a liberal interpretation of laws relating to vice and gambling by Fred Gigliotti, county committee treasurer, the crisis of 1958-59 denied the accuracy of that reasoning. Public indignation was aroused in the righteous, creating a climate which permitted the Organization's power to be challenged by Republicans and Democrats alike. The Republicans had a purge of their own as did the Democrats after them. The Citizens Association of Greater Utica, the League of Women Voters, and other groups forced debate on local issues and were instrumental in adopting the ward redistricting proposal in 1960 and the County Charter the following year. The Old Guard Democratic Organization had lost a portion of its autonomy.

Reform

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.
(Niccolo Machiavelli)

The 1961 election proved to be a crucial one for the Organization. If the Democrats could recoup the losses suffered in 1959, the Organization

¹"Report from Utica," Look, vol. 22, no. 14, p. 35, July 8, 1958; and "Wide-Open Town," Newsweek, vol. 51, no. 28, February 24, 1958.

could have returned to its previous position of prominence. But the voters rejected the Organization Mayoral candidate, Gerald Donovan, who had won a three-man primary against a Reform and an independent Democrat. Changes in the party's formal and informal structure, which had begun two years earlier, continued through 1962. The most important consequence of these changes was that the Organization no longer was autonomous. It is no longer proper to speak of "the Organization" as the single most significant unit of the party. A rival organization has developed which threatens to effect a major revolution in Democratic politics in Oneida County. Machiavelli's admonition should be taken seriously, however.

In 1960 it was decided to replace county chairman McIncrow with Eugene Hanson. Hanson had held positions severally as assistant corporation counsel, with the Municipal Housing Authority, and as county attorney when the Democrats held control of the county government in 1950-51. He was a suburbanite who was said to have "class." He was not a Reform Democrat, however, replying to a question from the press about whether Elefante had "dropped out of the picture," "I hope nobody is out. We have to expand or contract, and the job of the county chairman is to expand."¹ Little expansion followed.

The Reform movement, which began in 1961, was headed by Vincent Rossi, who had been considered for the party nomination for Assemblyman in 1952. Tom Gilroy and Mike McGuirl, elected county welfare commissioner in 1961, joined forces with Rossi to cut into Organization strength on the county committee. Gilroy was elected county chairman in 1962, the first time in over 35 years that the party was seriously split.

When Hanson replaced McIncrow in 1960, other changes were also made. In Rome, Francis Larkin replaced Robert Arthur as city chairman. In Utica, City Chairman Frank Emma was succeeded by Stephen Pawlinga, who had been president of the Young Democrats and a close ally of Elefante. The county executive committee also underwent revision: Elefante, O'Dowd, Donnelley, J. Herbert Gilroy, John Dybas, and McKennan were removed. These changes, it must be remembered, were formal and official and not necessarily indicative of the Organization's demise. They were an attempt to save the Organization by removing controversial leaders from key positions. Elefante and the rest of the top leadership were still paramount, since no rival organization had yet developed. The seeds were in the wind, however.

By March 1962, the Reform group had won enough support on the county committee to replace the Organization chairman Hanson with Tom Gilroy. The rest of the old guard on the executive committee were dumped: Fred Gigliotti (Treas.), Harold Hymes (Secy.), Elmer Bauer (V-Chmn.), Nicholas Rizzo, Anthony DeGironem, Anthony LaGatta, Donovan, Marie Daly, Frank Emma, and G. Carl Morse. The official spokesmen for the party in the county were now Reform Democrats who owed no allegiance to the old guard Organization. From their new-found position of official eminence, their task was to create a new organization, for the old guard was down but not out.

In the Utica city committee a parallel battle for the formal positions of power ensued several months later when Gilroy called for an election for

¹Utica Observer Dispatch, July 3, 1960, by Bill Lohden.

city chairman. Alfred Mirante, the leader of the Central City Democratic Club (old 7th, 12th and 15th Wards) was elected over Rossi, Bud Smith (the west Utica leader who replaced O'Dowd), and Raymond Stefano. The meeting of the city committee at which Mirante was elected was boycotted by the east Utica Organization committeemen. Only 85 of the 170 committeemen voted.

Mirante started out as a would-be Reform city chairman, but later he seems to have returned to the old guard. Relations between Mirante and Gilroy have been strained, so that an opportunity to develop a rudimentary Reform organization seems to have been missed.

In east Utica the post of east Utica Democratic Leader -- an informal position held by Elefante until he resigned in 1950 and by Rufus P. Cavallo, ex-public safety commissioner, until his death in 1952 -- was given to Nick Rizzo in 1959 after a seven-year vacancy. Elefante was still the de facto leader in east Utica, however. In September 1962, Elefante called for a re-organization of east Utica Democrats. At a free dinner, rival to Gilroy's fund-raising affair before the election, Elefante drew a larger crowd than Gilroy. His guest speaker Carmine DeSapio was well received, but did not get the rousing ovation that greeted Rufie.

Two days before Elefante's dinner he was enjoined by a State Supreme Court Justice from using the name "East Utica Democratic Club (or Organization)," and from soliciting or spending funds for his dinner. The injunction was over-ruled later, however.

Although the new Reform movement has found sympathy in the City of Utica, it has found nowhere near the organization that is still loyal to Rufus Elefante. So far it has not had the power resources, such as contracts and jobs, with which it could develop its organizational base. Without a solid organizational base, it is impossible to develop a meaningful sub-leadership. Since the Reform leaders are trying to give the party a new look, they will have to find something more "respectable" than the means used by the old guard to oil their machine. The formation of the women's division in 1962 may well be the kind of step which will offer new bases of unity for the new organization. Other methods might emphasize social rewards of party identification, rather than the mainly economic rewards which characterized the old guard Organization. Economics cannot be ignored, however. Attention to the needs of the underprivileged groups in the city could be productive of converting allegiances from the old guard to the Reform organization if a sustained and successful drive accompanied such effort.

The old guard, although declining, is still able to get things done. It commands the loyalty of many Utica Democrats. While its style of politics is growing anachronistic, it still exhibits remarkable tenacity. A wedding of the old guard with the Reform group is out of the question. That the old guard will recover its lost power is doubtful. Yet it will survive until its top leaders die. Meanwhile a new generation of Democrats will struggle for power, the Reform movement will change its character, and a new episode in Utica politics will begin where the old one leaves off.

APPENDIX A

Selected Items from the Political Committee Statement Filed by the Oneida County Democratic County Committee, November, 1962, Leon J. Marketos, Treasurer.

Receipts

<u>Date</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
6/7/62	John F. Kennedy Birthday Party	\$ 800.00
10/19/62	Golden Donkey contribution ticket	2,900.00
11/8/62	Annual \$25.00 dinner ticket	14,950.00
11/9/62	Leon J. Marketos	300.00
11/9/62	Richard O.C. Kehoe	300.00
11/9/62	Vincent Rossi	300.00
11/9/62	Dominick Jampietro	300.00
11/9/62	Richard Noonan	300.00
Various	Miscellaneous	524.00
Various	Advances from Lawrence Gilroy, Jr.	8,847.50
4/16/63	Membership dues	195.00
5/17/63	National chairman John M. Bailey Dinner	10,070.00
	Sub-total	39,786.50
	Other	520.00
	Total	40,306.50

Expenditures

10/11/62	Political Images, Inc. Advertisement	2,000.00
10/22/62	Same	1,500.00
10/24/62	Same	500.00
10/29/62	Same	2,000.00
9/62	Same	1,000.00
9/62	Same	1,500.00
9/62	Same	1,200.00
8/62	Democratic State Committee for John F. Kennedy Birthday Party	1,800.00
8/62	New York Telephone Company	1,200.00
10/24/62	Hotel Utica, rent	500.00
11/9/62	Oneida Nat'l Bank, overdraft of previous committee	120.00
Various	WKTU, Utica Observer Dispatch, etc. adver.	6,049.44
Various	Miscellaneous; stamps; office supplies, etc.	300.00
--	Distribution costs, Bailey dinner	785.00
--	Cash disbursed to committeemen & Poll Workers	4,000.00
12/12/62	Return to Noonan for a dance	520.00
--	Metzler Printing Co., Inc. Advertising	1,448.71
--	Dodge-Graphic Press., Inc. Posters	1,911.75
--	Hotel Utica, rent & banquet service	4,740.95
--	General Outdoor Advertising	1,000.00
--	Owed to L.T. Gilroy	8,847.00
	Sub-total	43,102.85
	Other	14,190.71
	Total	57,293.56

APPENDIX B

Population of Old Utica Wards: 1950-1960.

WARD	POPULATION		PERCENT CHANGE
	1960	1950	1950-1960
1	393	552	-45.1%
2	2586	3198	-19.1
3	1784	2699	-33.9
4	1976	2566	-23.0
5	1022	1916	-45.7
6	2171	2038	+ 6.5
7	11295	11489	- 1.7
8	13420	15511	-13.5
9	4647	5860	-20.7
10	3275	3749	-12.6
11	9010	9126	- 1.3
12	8048	8428	- 4.5
13	11896	10260	+15.9
14	8821	8658	+ 1.9
15	5320	5775	- 7.9
16	6673	2834	+135.5
17	8073	7169	+12.6

APPENDIX C

Vote for Mayor by Wards, 1949 - 1959.

	Percentage of Vote								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1959	91.6	84.8	63.5	47.6	84.6	53.6	26.9	66.4	53.0
1957	96.8	90.5	74.4	62.1	94.2	71.1	35.2	79.0	72.2
1955	91.3	86.5	68.9	55.4	88.4	69.3	37.5	70.6	65.1
1953	93.3	80.2	66.3	45.0	76.6	62.1	38.1	65.1	59.4
1951	94.6	86.1	71.3	53.6	79.9	70.1	49.7	62.3	68.5
1949	92.5	83.3	62.9	49.7	88.9	61.4	38.9	82.3	60.8
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	City
1959	60.7	40.6	43.2	52.9	34.6	36.3	36.3	23.7	45.5
1957	74.9	56.7	59.9	69.9	55.6	52.8	54.3	41.1	61.7
1955	68.8	54.1	56.4	60.5	52.1	50.4	51.3	33.8	57.0
1953	55.5	52.2	46.4	53.8	46.6	43.5	43.2	27.4	52.1
1951	56.0	59.4	59.0	53.1	56.8	57.7	52.2	48.6	58.7
1949	66.2	48.3	54.6	65.7	45.1	85.6	49.3	37.6	57.7

APPENDIX D

Conversion Table: old Utica Wards to new (1961) Wards.

<u>NEW WARD NUMBER</u>	<u>OLD WARD NUMBER</u>
1	2, 3
2	6, 9
3	14
4	*
5, 6	17
7	7
8, 9, 10	12, 15
11, 12, 13	13
14, 15	8
16	1, 4, 5, 10
17	16

* New 4th Ward contains 3 of the 7 election districts of the old 11th Ward:
E.D.'s 3, 4, 5.

APPENDIX E

Oneida County Chairman of the Democratic County Committee.

Lawrence T. Gilroy	(1962-Present)
Eugene M. Hanson	(1960-1962)
Walter D. McIncrow	(1956-1960)
J. Herbert Gilroy	(1944-1956)

Utica Mayors 1922-1963 (terms of office)

Frank Dulan (R)	(1960-1963)
John McKennan (D)	(1956-1959)
Boyd E. Golder (D)	(1946-1955)
J. Bradbury German, Jr. (R)	(1944-1945)
Vincent R. Corrou (D)	(1936-1943)
Samuel Sloan (R)	(1934-1935)
Charles S. Donnelly (D)	(1930-1933)
Fred J. Rath (R)	(1928-1929)
Frederick Gillimore (D)	(1924-1927)
Fred J. Douglas (R)	(1922-1923)

Utica Aldermen, 1925-1959 (Years of Election):WARD

- 1 F. Marino (1921-1925), Daniel Laino (D) (1927-1941), Casalletta (D) (1943), T. Jones (D) (1945-1951), P. Comite (D) (1953-1959).
- 2 Sol R. Goldbas (1925), Lena Goldbas (D) (1927-1947), Moses Goldbas (D) (1949-1959).
- 3 Ch. Thomas (1925-1939), Ch. Tayler (1941-1945), J. Meskal (D) (1947-1959).
- 4 Ed Martin (1955), F. Davis (1927-1929), Wm. Langdon (1931-1935), H. Perkins (1937), E.V. Booth (1939-1941), Earl W. Schram (R) (1943), D. Reed (1945), Schram (R) (1947), C. Emery (1949), Schram (R) (1951), J. Edward Collins (D) (1953-1959), John E. Jones (Apptd).
- 5 Alf. Bertolini (R) (1925), Ant. Marrone (D) (1927-1929), F. Marino (D) (1931-1935), B.A. DiIorio (D) (1937), Ruggiero (D) (1939-1953), F. Trino (D) (1955-1959).
- 6 J. Weikert (1925-1931), Melvin Rose (1933), Jos. Schmalz (1935-1949), John Tallman (D) (1951-1959).
- 7 Stan Jones (1925), R.L. Roberts (1927-1931), E. Williams (1933-1941), John Griffiths (1943-1945), Larry Odell (R) (1947-1949), Cummings (R) (1951-1957), John H. Weiler (R) (1959).
- 8 J.P. Romanzo (1925), Emma (D) (1927-1933), James Ricco (D) (1935), Ant Daniele (D) (1937-1939), DeGironemo (D) (1941-1943), F. Romanelli (D) (1945-1951), Jos. Napoli (D) (1953-1959).
- 9 George Ball (1925), Edward Hirt (1927-1929), Morath (Apptd.) (1931-1933), Jos. J. Zyla (D) (1935-1945), Sutkowski (D) (1947-1949), Wereszynski (D) (1951-1959), Edward Roach (1925-1929)
- 10 Edward Roach (1925-1929), William Appler (1931-1933), Joseph Palmiero (1935-1937), Fred Grieco (1939-1941), Ch. Coupe (1943-1945), Jos. Peters (D) (1947-1959).
- 11 Thomas Cole (1925-1929), R. Brown (1931), F. Blum (1931-1945), G. Fauth (D) (1947-1959).
- 12 J. Campbell (1925), Geo. Martus (1927-1929), Anna Martus (Apptd), Albert H. Simmons (1931-1933), Harold Mullen (1935-1939), Frank Jones (1941-1943), D.D. Shields (D) (1945-1947), John Eichler (1949), Shields (D) (1951), John Evans (R) (1953-1955), Mirante (D) (1957-1959).
- 13 Peter Smith (1925), Walter Graham (1927-1933), Donovan (D) (1935-1951), John Flemma (R) (1953-1955), Frank Dardano (D) (1957), Louis F. Tomaino (D) (1959).

- 14 Frank P. Hansmann (D) (1925-1959).
 - 15 O.E. Mellor (1925), D. Kline (1927-1929), Wesley Williams (1931-1937), J. Stanley Williams (1935-1947), Lynch (R) (1949-1959).
 - 16 Van Weaver (1925-1929), Phil Hoff (1931-1947), Ch. Canfield (R) (1949-1951), B. Eugene Winslow (D) (1943-1947), Gordon W. Hathaway (1959).
 - 17 Edgar C. Bushinger (R) (1925-1933), Wm. Boutilier (R) (1935-1949), Ralph Steim (R) (1951), Eugene Hubbard (R) (1953-1955), Rexford W. Gilliland (R) (1957-1959).
- Pres.- Willard Roberts (1925-1931), Henry Smith (1933-1943), Jos. Foley (1945-1947), DeGironemo (1949-1953), Robert Falvo (1955), Ger. Natiella (1957), Flemma (R) (1959) (1961).

